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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOTT A. WRIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010345-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Wright was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing? Where a trial court has previously held an evidentiary hearing 
on a motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel, such a claim presents a mixed 
question of law and fact." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995); see 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject 
to de novo review of the ultimate legal question of whether the defendant has received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." Perry, 899 P.2d 
at 1239. 
This issue was preserved in Wright's Notice of Appeal (R. 159). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution; Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an' impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, wrhich district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Scott A. Wright appeals from the sentence and commitment of the Third District 
Court after entering a plea of guilty to one count of operation of a clandestine lab, 
enhanced to a first degree felony. This Court temporarily remanded this case to the 
Third District Court pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for 
the purpose of findings of fact relevant to the claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at sentencing. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Scott A. Wright was charged by information filed in the Third District Court on 
July 13, 2000, with one count of operation of a clandestine lab, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b), enhanced to a fust 
degree felony pursuant to § 58-37d-5(d) and (f) (R. 3-4). On December 1, 2000, an 
amended information was filed notifying Wright that he is subject to enhancement 
under Utah Code? Annotated § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (f), and/or (g) (R. 30-31). 
On September 28, 2000, Deborah Kreeck Mendez filed an appearance of counsel 
in behalf of Wright (R. 18). 
On January 23, 2001, Wright entered a plea of guilty to operating a clandestine 
laboratory, enhanced to a first degree felony for being within 500 ft of a residence (R. 
142-49, 150). 
On March 9, 2001, based on Wright's conviction of operation of a clandestine 
laboratory, the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian sentenced Wright to an indeterminate 
time of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison (R. 152). 
On March 15, 2001, Wright's trial counsel, Mendez, filed a Motion to Grant 
Credit for Time Served, because "counsel forgot to ask the Court to recommend to the 
Board of Pardons to grant him credit for time served" (R. 155). Wright was granted 
credit for 170 days previously served (R. 157). 
On April 6, 2001, Wright filed his Notice of Appeal from the sentencing order 
in the above case (R. 159). 
On February 5, 2002, Edward R. Montgomery, in behalf of Wright, filed a 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 23B Motion for Remand (R. 201-08). Wright 
asserted that trial counsel incorrectly advised Wright of the elements of the crime 
charged and rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing (R. 201-08). 
On May 15, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case to the Third 
District Court pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R. 181); 
see also State v. Wright, 2002 UT App 180. This case was temporarily remanded for 
the purpose of findings of fact relevant to the claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing (R. 181). The relevant factual issues to 
be reviewed are: 
(1) what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in preparation for sentencing 
and what additional efforts could have been undertaken; (2) what were counsel's 
reasons for handling sentencing as counsel did; (3) what additional information 
relevant to sentencing could have been discovered by counsel prior to 
sentencing; and (4) was the omission of the additional information prejudicial to 
Wright at sentencing. 
(R. 181). 
The Honorable Judge Michael K. Burton presided over the evidentiary hearings 
relevant to this Court's Order of Remand pursuant to Rule 23B, which were held on 
July 12, 2002 and August 23, 2002 (R. 315, 316). Closing arguments were conducted 
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on December 3, 2002 and Judge Burton filed his Findings on Remand (R. 304-14). 
The Findings on Remand are attached in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 23, 2001, Wright pleaded guilty to operating a clandestine 
laboratory, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4(l)(a) 
and (b), enhanced for being within 500 feet of a residence (R. 150). Mendez talked 
Wright into pleading guilty even though he maintained that he did not cook or distribute 
any methamphetamine (R. 175: 12-13, 19; 201-202). Mendez counseled Wright that 
this did not matter because the statute was very broad and that he would be convicted 
anyway (R. 201-201, 175: 12-13). Wright was sentenced to an indeterminate time of 
not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison (R. 152). 
Wright timely appealed claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, Deborah 
Kreeck Mendez, was ineffective in representing him at sentencmg (R. 159, 201-08, 
290). Wright filed a motion pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requesting that this Court remand the case to the trial court for findings of 
fact on his ineffective assistance claim (R. 201-208). 
By order dated May 15, 2002, this Court granted the remand (R. 181). The case 
was remanded to the Honorable Michael K. Burton to make factual findings on 
ineffective assistance of counsel and whether trial counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced 
Wright at sentencing (R. 304). The trial court was to specifically find 
(1) what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in preparation for sentencing 
and what additional efforts could have been undertaken; (2) what were counsel's 
reasons for handling sentencing as counsel did; (3) what additional information 
relevant to sentencing could have been discovered by counsel prior to 
sentencing; and (4) was the omission of the additional information prejudicial to 
Wright at sentencing. 
(R. 181). 
Preliminary Hearing 
The Preliminary Hearing was held on November 14, 2000, before the Honorable 
Ann Boyden (R. 174). 
Detective Goodwin testified that on March 10, 2000, he had obtained 
information that the co-defendant, Josh Corbett, was dealing methamphetamine (R. 
174: 7-8). Detective Goodwin contacted Corbett in a public parking lot and asked him 
about his dealings with methamphetamine (R. 174: 8). Corbett told Detective Goodwin 
that he was operating a clandestine laboratory in the residence he rented and he gave 
Detective Goodwin consent to go and search his residence (R. 174: 12). 
Detective Goodwin obtained a search warrant to search the residence because 
two other individuals lived there (R. 174: 12). Detective Goodwin, along with other 
officers, executed the search warrant on March 10, 2000 (R. 174: 12). In the upstairs 
northeast bedroom, the officers found an operational clandestine laboratory, although at 
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the time it was not in actual operation (R. 174: 13). The officers also found an 
undisclosed amount of methamphetamine at the residence (R. 174: 17). 
Detective Goodwin testified that Scott Wright was in the garage during the 
search and that Wright, along with other individuals was retained during the execution 
of the search warrant (R. 174: 1445). Detective Goodwin testified that Wright 
indicated that he rented the northeast bedroom, one of the locations where laboratory 
equipment materials were located (R. 174: 17). 
Detective Brown testified that he also participated in the execution of the search 
warrant (R. 147: 64). Detective Brown testified that while he was in the garage, he 
overheard Wright telling one of the children that the police officers were there because 
"I did something bad, I did something wrong and that's why they are here" (R. 174: 
65). Detective Brown testified that he did not recall Wright specifying what he did 
wrong (R. 174: 65). 
Detective Brown testified that after Wright was placed in custody and 
Mirandized, he "explained all the dangers and how dangerous it was for us to be in 
there and for that type of activity to be going on," to Wright (R. 174: 65). After 
Wright was warned of these dangers, Detective Brown testified that Wright "turned to 
me and he said, 'You've been very nice to me, I'd like to tell you something but I don't 
think I should.'" (R. 174: 65-66). Wright then told Detective Brown about various 
hazardous waste products that were in the house that were by-products of cooking 
methamphetamine (R. 174: 66): 
Detective Jeff Payne testified that it was his opinion that all the precursor 
materials to produce methamphetamine were located at the residence and identified for 
the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 174: 77, 82-83). 
Detective Cramer testified that he took fingerprints of all the items located at the 
residence, however there was no evidence that Wright's fingerprints were found on any 
of the items (R. 174: 44). 
At the end of the preliminary hearing, Mendez argued that Wright had no 
knowledge that children were in the residence (R. 174: 90). 
Sentencing Hearing 
The Sentencing Hearing was held on March 9, 2001, before the Honorable Pat 
B. Brian (R. 175). Deborah Kreeck Mendez represented Wright. 
The State argued that AP&P's recommendation of a year in prison and in-patient 
counseling did not fit the crime (R. 175: 4-5). The State argued that officers found an 
operational clandestine laboratory in Wright's bedroom, so Wright must have been 
more involved in this case (R. 175: 6). The State argued that Wright's claim of 
minimal involvement was not accurate because of the operational lab found in his 
bedroom, the amount of precursor materials found with it, as well as "a substantial 
quantity of methamphetamine" found in the home (R. 175: 6-8). 
The State also argued that Wright must be involved in selling drugs because a 
co-defendant that lived with Wright, Josh Corbett, already admitted to selling drugs and 
that the landlord liked to rent to cooks (R. 175: 9, 20). 
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The State farther argued that when the officers searched the home, they found 
two children inside the home when the search was executed (R. 175: 6). The State 
asked the trial court to commit Wright to prison based on the amount of drugs found at 
the scene, the lab being operational, children being present in the home while the lab 
was operational, Wright's juvenile history, his history as a felon, and his prior drug use 
(R. 175: 10). 
Mendez responded to the State's argument by asserting that Wright had no 
involvement in selling drugs (R. 175: 11-12). Mendez explained that Wright did 
provide a place for Josh Corbett to cook drugs, and that Wright did use the 
methamphetamines produced, but Wright was not involved in either cooking or selling 
the drugs (R. 175: 12). Mendez asserted that although the lab was found in Wright's 
bedroom, Wright had not been living in that room (R. 175: 13). 
Mendez farther attempted to explain to the trial court that Wright did not know 
that children were at the house and that some lady had mistakenly brought them over, 
but Mendez's explanation was unclear (R. 175: 13-14). 
Mendez argued that Wright has consistently been employed and "when I talked 
to his family, talked to everyone, he was still an emotional father for his children" (R. 
175: 14-15). 
Mendez explained to the trial court that Wright grew up in a "hard background" 
(R. 175: 16). Mendez explained that when Wright was young, "his mother died. His 
father has been involved with methamphetamine and has had to really fight it" (R. 175 
o 
16). Mendez also explained that Wright has taken responsibility for allowing Josh 
Corbett to "cook" methamphetamine in his home, but that Wright did not put the lab 
there nor did he participate in producing any drugs (R. 175: 17). 
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court stated: 
When people start cooking [methamphetamine] they know two things. 
It's a poison that is in high demand and it is a poison that has a high margin of 
profit. It costs little or nothing to make it and the profit is absolutely mind-
boggling.... 
The problem is with what is so absolutely glaring in Plaintiffs exhibit No. 
21 that was admitted for purposes of this sentencing..., this stuff is highly 
dangerous. And you can pick up a newspaper and practically on a daily basis 
some place, one of these things goes south and a fire starts or a contamination 
gets spread. And what do these kids know about it? They're there exposed to 
all of the stuff that goes on. They don't have the sophistication that either a 
detective or defendant can defend themselves from it... 
And I don't buy into this notion that the defendant was equivalent to those 
three monkeys that we read about periodically, they see nothing, they hear 
nothing, they speak nothing. I'm not buying it. 
1
 State's exhibit number 2 is a copy of photographs of two children found at the 
residence during the execution of the search warrant as well as a photograph of 
laboratory equipment found at the residence. 
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And we know for sure that for whatever reason he was getting enough of 
this stuff for his own personal use. I mean, there had to be some quid pro quo 
some place along the way.... 
I've read the presentence report carefully. I am convinced that the 
defendant was in this mess up to his ears. And I have read nor heard nothing 
today that causes me to think to the contrary. 
He's been convicted of a first degree felony. No legal reason had been 
established why sentence should not be imposed. He's committed to the Utah 
State Penitentiary for the term prescribed by law....And it is my hope that this 
morning, the word goes out, if you cook in this town and you come to my court 
you're going to prison. 
(R. 175: 22-24). 
Evidentiary Hearings 
On July 12, 2002, Judge Burton held the first of two evidentiary hearings 
concerning the ineffectiveness (R. 191, 315). At the hearing, Mendez gave testimony 
regarding this Court's temporary remand order (R. 315). 
Mendez testified that she did not follow her normal routine in preparation for 
Wright's sentencing hearing (R. 315: 15-16). Mendez reviewed the presentence 
investigation (PSI) report the night before the sentencing hearing and then met with 
Wright for approximately 15 minutes before the hearing and discussed the report with 
him (R. 315: 16-18). Mendez also briefly talked with Wright's sister briefly before 
the hearing (R. 315: 18). Mendez's only other preparation for the sentencing hearing 
was a few notes she made on her copy of the PSI report for her argument at the hearing 
as she talked with Wright (R. 315: 26-27). 
Mendez testified that because this was a first degree felony conviction, normally, 
the presumption would be that sentencing would include prison time (R. 315: 16). 
Mendez testified that she normally would review the facts in the PSI report in detail, 
talk with family members and employers, and talk with the defendant discussing all the 
information and putting together an argument (R. 315: 15). With this information, she 
would normally have family, friends, and employers testify at the sentencing hearing or 
give letters to the judge in behalf of the defendant in order to "humanize" the defendant 
and remind the judge that the defendant does not always act this way (R. 315: 20). 
Mendez also stated that she would normally prepare an outline to guide her and remind 
her of her goal and what she hoped to accomplish during the sentencing hearing (R. 
315: 26-27). 
Mendez testified that she did not follow her normal routine because of her heavy 
caseload and because the PSI report recommended probation instead of incarceration 
(R. 315: 16-18). Mendez also stated that she believed probation was justified because 
Wright had a minimal record, he had good family support, and he had been out of 
custody and had done well (R. 315: 33-35). 
Mendez stated that her goal at the sentencing hearing was to demonstrate that 
Wright was a minor player in the drug manufacturing operation with a minimal 
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criminal history (R. 315: 27). Mendez testified that she did not believe she properly 
represented Wright at the sentencing hearing, stating "this case haunts me" (R. 315: 
30). 
Mendez acknowledged that she should have had Wright's family members and 
employers provide letters of recommendation to the judge and to AP&P (R. 315: 20). 
Wright's sister, father, and other family members were willing to provide a letter of 
recommendation before the sentencing hearing, but Mendez failed to ask for them2 (R. 
315: 19-21). 
Mendez also stated that she should have prepared better and presumed that 
prison was the most likely outcome and prepare her presentation from that perspective 
(R. 315: 14-15). Mendez testified that she should have reviewed the PSI report in 
more careful detail with Wright, comparing the facts contained in it with the facts she 
had previously documented in her file during the course of her preparation for trial (R. 
315: 15). Mendez admitted that the PSI report did not contain an adequate 
representation of Wright's life history and family background because the report was 
"distilled" (R. 315: 40). 
Mendez also acknowledged that she should have prepared an outline for 
argument detailing that Wright was a minor participant in the crime, that he had a 
2
 At the evidentiary hearing, Wright introduced 7 letters of recommendation to the trial 
court, each attached in the Addenda (R. 315: 23-26). 
minimal record, and that he was a caring father and did not want any children around 
the house containing the methamphetamine lab (R. 315: 26-28, 46). 
Mendez stated that she failed to inform the sentencing judge that Wright is a 
responsible person in many ways (R. 315: 30). Although the PSI report stated that 
Wright's mother died when Wright was a child, Mendez failed to inform the sentencing 
judge the details surrounding the death of Wright's mother and the fact that Wright had 
been sexually abused as a child (R. 316: 43-44). Mendez testified that she knew that 
Wright "had been leally impacted by the death of his mother" and that this was still an 
"unresolved issue" (R. 315: 30). 
Mendez also knew of Wright's abusive, alcoholic father and the difficult 
circumstances Wright grew up in (R. 315: 30). Mendez testified that Wright had been 
abused by his father, and "because he'd been abused and didn't learn any coping skills 
through his family and upbringing, he would hide through his drugs" (R. 315: 31). 
However, Mendez failed to inform the trial court of this abuse and the serious impact it 
had on Wright's life. 
Mendez also testified that although Wright was a methamphetamine addict, 
whenever he was high he made sure that he was not around his family or children 
during his episodes, but when he was sober, he was very helpful and had a good work 
ethic (R. 315: 32-33, 46). Again, Mendez failed to inform the trial court concerning 
Wright's strong family ties and his attempts to behave responsibly around his family. 
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Mendez further testified that although Judge Brian stated that the evidence 
showed that Wright was "into it up to his ears," Mendez stated "that wasn't my opinion 
based on the investigation that I had done in preparation for trial" (R. 315: 44). 
Mendez testified that she failed to inform the sentencing judge that Wright had not been 
at that residence for several days prior to the search and that she failed to give the 
sentencing judge affidavits supporting that fact (R. 315: 45). 
Mendez also testified that the sentencing judge was misinformed about young 
children being in the house when the officers searched it (R. 315: 42). Mendez 
testified that the children either arrived "right after the police got there and/or moments 
before; and they were not in that house and they weren't right there" (R. 315: 42). 
Moreover, Mendez testified that children were not living in the home nor did they come 
there on a regular basis (R. 315: 46). In fact, Wright had told the mother of the 
children not to bring them around and Mendez testified that she could have obtained 
affidavits supporting this, but she failed to do so (R. 315: 46). 
Mendez testified that she could have taken affidavits from Wright's neighbors 
and father explaining that Wright was not involved to the extent that the trial court 
believed him to be (R. 315: 42, 45). 
Mendez testified that she believed that if she had made Judge Brian aware of all 
the facts, the outcome would have been different (R. 315: 42). 
Judge Pat B. Brian and Lisa Neilson testified at the evidentiary hearing held on 
August 23, 2002 (R. 316). 
Lisa Neilson testified that Wright is her younger brother (R. 316: 39). Neilson 
testified that she informed Mendez prior to the sentencing hearing that she would 
provide Mendez with letters of reference or do whatever she needed to do (R. 316: 40). 
Neilson testified that when her mother was killed in a car accident, Wright 
blamed himself (R. 316: 42). Wright was standing up in the car before their mother 
rolled the car several times, and he blamed himself for her death (R. 316: 42). After 
the accident, Neilson testified that Wright "just wasn't the same. He wouldn't talk. He 
didn't want to do anything. He laid on the couch with his body and his head facing 
towards the back of the couch away from everything." (R. 316: 42). Neilson testified 
that Wright never received counseling for this (R. 316: 43). 
Neilson further testified that a few years later, Wright was sexually abused, but 
never received any counseling for this either (R. 316: 44). 
Neilson also testified that their father was a drunk, and life with him was "a 
living hell." (R. 316: 45). Neilson testified: 
We were left alone all the time. There was no food in the house. We'd come 
home from school, and we'd either [sic] a scoop of brown sugar, because that's 
all there was to eat. And he would be gone until 11:00 o'clock at night when 
we'd be so scared we'd call him and ask him to please come home because we 
were scared; and then we were hurry and run, get in the bunk beds and pretend 
like we were asleep because we knew when he got home that all hell was going 
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to break loose; even though at that point we had determined that we would rather 
have him there and be mad than be by ourselves. 
(R. 316: 45). Nielson farther testified that this behavior occurred over years of time 
and "at times daily" (R. 316: 45). 
Even though life with their father was extremely difficult, when Wright was of 
age to leave the house, he chose to stay and take care of his father (R. 316: 45-46). 
Neilson also testified that she never had to worry about Wright stealing from her, even 
though he always had access to her home (R. 316: 46). If Wright ever needed 
anything, he would simply ask, and "he would always insist that he do something, 'I 
need to mow your lawn,' or you know - 'you know, what can I help you do?'" (R. 
316: 46). 
Neilson also testified that she was surprised to learn that children were at the 
residence where the methamphetamine lab was found because she heard Wright 
repeatedly tell his ex-girlfriend, "Do not bring the kids around." (R. 316: 47). Nielson 
testified that even though those children were not his own, he "was very good to those 
kids," and that "he loves his [own] kids dearly" (R. 316: 47). 
Judge Brian testified that he presided over Wright's sentencing hearing held on 
March 9, 2001 (R. 316: 5). Judge Brian testified that he believed that Mendez's 
performance in behalf of Wright at the sentencing hearing was "extremely effective" 
(R. 316: 6). 
Judge Brian testified that he sentenced Wright to the maximum penalty of five 
years to life in this case "because he deserved it" (R. 316: 7). Judge Brain testified that 
he believed Wright deserved the maximum penalty because "he was an active 
participant cooking methamphetamine with children in the home in a neighborhood 
where people lived close by and he put the stuff in circulation for people to buy and 
ruin their lives with." (R. 316: 7). 
Judge Brian further testified that although Mendez failed to inform him of 
additional information about Wright's background, including his tough childhood, 
strong family support, good work history, being a good father and his usually 
responsible character, this information would have made no difference in the sentence 
handed down on Wright (R. 316: 9-10). 
Judge Brian also testified that under Utah law, there are different ways that 
crimes are classified (R. 316: 12). Judge Brian testified that in order to pass sentence 
on an individual convicted of a crime, he needs information surrounding the events of 
the crime, the facts and circumstances, and the background of the criminal (R. 316: 14-
15). Judge Brian testified that he uses all of this information in passing sentence (R. 
316: 15). 
Judge Brian testified that he was unaware that Wright was three years old when 
he was with his molher in a car accident and watched her bleed to death and that 
Wright was severely affected by this traumatic event, but he never received any 
counseling for it (R. 316: 18). Judge Brian was also unaware that Wright was sexually 
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molested as a child and that his father was a drug addict and alcoholic who repeatedly 
physically and psychologically abused him (R. 316: 19, 20). However, Judge Brian 
testified that these events "would not affect [Wright's] judgment on whether or not it 
was illegal and unlawful to cook methamphetamine" (R. 316: 19). 
Judge Brian testified that the fact that many associated with Wright trusted him 
implicitly, thought well of him, considered him a warmhearted, caring, giving person 
did not matter id this case because "I don't think everybody who knew him thought 
well of him if they knew that he was providing methamphetamine to anybody that had 
ten bucks in their pocket" (R. 316: 25-26). 
Judge Brian testified that one of the reasons he gave Wright the maximum 
sentence was the he believed Wright was distributing methamphetamine (R. 316: 26). 
Judge Brian further testified that even if Wright was only cooking methamphetamine for 
personal consumption, it was still unlawful and this would not change the sentence (R. 
316: 26-27). 
Judge Brian also testified that even if Wright had repeatedly tried to keep 
children away from the house and that he did not want any children near the drugs, this 
would not make any difference "because [children] were there" (R. 316: 28). 
Judge Brian admitted that he stated at the sentencing hearing that if someone 
cooks in his city, they were going to prison (R. 316: 28). Judge Brian retracted this 
statement somewhat and testified "maybe not every cook goes to prison; just those that 
did what your client did" (R. 316: 31, 34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Scott Wright was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel at his sentencing hearing. Wright's trial counsel failed to present mitigating 
character evidence in behalf of Wright and farther failed to present sufficient evidence 
to the trial court in order to correct the trial court's inaccurate understanding of the 
extent of Wright's involvement in operating the drug lab. 
Wright's trial counsel had available mitigating evidence, including Wright's 
tragic childhood, minimal criminal history, extensive family support, favorable work 
history, and positive employer relations, but failed to adequately present this evidence 
before the trial court because of her heavy case load and reliance on a favorable PSI 
report. Moreover, trial counsel failed to correct the trial court's inaccurate 
understanding of Wright's involvement in this case. The trial court mistakenly believed 
that Wright was manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine. Trial counsel had 
available evidence to the contrary, but failed to adequately present this evidence to the 
trial court. Trial counsel's failure to present this mitigating evidence fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. 
Further, Trial counsel's deficient performance prevented the trial court from 
making an informed decision under the totality of the circumstances. Had the trial 
court been aware of all the relevant information regarding Wright's life history and the 
extent of his involvement in this case, the sentencing outcome would have been 
different. 
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Finally, because of counsel's deficient performance, Wright was denied his right 
to due process and fundamental fairness at sentencing—a critical stage of the criminal 
proceedings-as the trial court lacked reliable and relevant information in exercising his 
discretion in the imposition of sentence. Wright asserts that the exercise of a sound 
discretion in the imposition of sentence requires the trial court to consider all 
circumstances of the crime as well as the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant's life and characteristics; and that because of counsel's deficient performance 
in this matter, the trial court lacked the information necessary to exercise such a sound 
discretion. 
Accordingly, Wright requests that this Court conclude that he was denied his 
constitutional right to effective counsel at sentencing and order that this matter be 
remanded to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WRIGHT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT HIS SENTENCING 
HEARING 
"Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 
(Utah 1982). 
Wright asserts that his trial counsel failed to present available character witnesses 
that would show his positive attributes including his life history, positive work history, 
and extensive family support. Moreover, trial counsel failed to offer sufficient 
evidence to the trial court in order to correct the trial court's inaccurate understanding 
of the extent of Wright's involvement in operating the clandestine drug lab. Wright 
asserts that these mitigating factors would have provided the trial court with an accurate 
understanding of his involvement in the crime. Trial counsel's deficient performance at 
the sentencing hearing impermissibly prejudiced him thereby denying him his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Wright asserts that if these facts had been brought to 
light, the sentencing outcome would have been different. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to 
show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error." State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2053, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
"Although a defendant may show that he or she was denied effective assistance 
of counsel by satisfying both prongs of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the principles set out in Strickland 'do not establish mechanical rules. 
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Instead these principles 'are guides 
to the ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged. 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405; accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 
because '[t]he purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that defendant receives a fair 
trial.' State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 
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524, 533 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). "The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the fairness of a proceeding is challenged by a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because '[t]he right to counsel plays a crucial role in the 
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill 
and knowledge is necessary to accord defendant's the 'ample opportunity to meet the 
case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled."" State v. Classon, 935 P.2d at 
533 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. at 2063, and Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 240, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). 
A. Wright's counsel at the sentencing hearing failed to zealously represent his 
interests and this deficient performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness • 
Trial counsel's failure to present Wright's life history and to correct the trial 
court's inaccurate understanding of Wright's involvement in the lab fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Wright must show that trial 
counsel's representations fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993). 
To meet this prong, Wright "must prove that specific, identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
"Whenever there is 'a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice 
of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result does not constitute 
ineffectiveness of counsel.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989)). 
The Utah Supreme Court held that defense attorneys "must adequately 
investigate all potentially mitigating factors" to provide effective assistance of counsel. 
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997). "Failure to investigate mitigating 
factors can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors actually 
exist and may be productively used in the penalty phase." Id., at 687. 
In Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 19871.. the defendant claimed 
his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing proceeding for failing to investigate 
and present mitigating evidence. Id. at 1431. The defendant was convicted on two 
counts of first degree murder and one count of robbery. Id. at 1432. 
The entire sentencing proceeding, including evidence, arguments, instructions, 
deliberation, and sentencing lasted a little more than one hour. Id. During the 
sentencing phase, trial counsel called only one mitigating witness, the defendant's parol 
officer. Id. 
After an evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant's ineffective claim, the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida concluded that "trial 
counsel failed to prepare for the sentencing proceeding by conducting a meaningful 
investigation." Id. Besides speaking with the parol officer, the only other preparation 
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trial counsel conducted before the sentencing proceeding "was a single conversation 
with the [defendant], his mother and stepfather." Id. However, no other witness 
presented any testimony at the sentencing hearing besides the parol officer. Id. 
The District Court also concluded that trial counsel was meffective because 
"several mitigating aspects of [defendant's] character could have been proved by 
witnesses who were available at the time of trial," and several other witnesses "would 
have testified at the sentencing hearing proceeding had they been asked." Id, 
The 11th Circuit in Armstrong agreed with the District Court's findings, and 
further held that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present this evidence at the 
sentencing proceeding was not trial strategy, but rather negligence on the part of trial 
counsel. Id. at 1433; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. The 11th Circuit found 
that trial counsel explicitly testified that his lack of investigation was not a strategic or 
tactical decision, but rather due to his lack of "inexperience coupled with the fact that it 
was a new procedure." Id. 
The 11th Circuit farther found that several witnesses were available that would 
testify concerning the defendant's history of nonviolence and religious activities, as well 
as his poverty and poor living conditions during his childhood. Id. Family members 
would testify about his hardworking nature and irregular school attendance due to the 
need to work to supplement his family's income. And an expert witness could have 
testified that the defendant "was mentally retarded and had organic brain damage." Id. 
The 11th Circuit held that the "demonstrated availability of undiscovered mitigating 
evidence clearly met the prejudice requirement" under Strickland and remanded for a 
new sentencing hearing. Id. at 1434, 1436. 
In Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 71 USLW 4560 (2003), Wiggins was 
convicted before a judge for first degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft. Id. 
at 2532. After his conviction, Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury. Id. 
At the sentencing hearing, Wiggins' trial counsel explained to the jury in her 
opening statement "[y]ou're going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. 
It has not been easy for him. But he's worked. He's tried to be a productive citizen, 
and he's reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no 
convictions, period....I think that's an important thing for you to consider." Id. 
However, during the proceedings themselves, trial counsel introduced no evidence of 
Wiggins' life history or family background. Id. 
Instead of presenting mitigating evidence, trial counsel decided to pursue an 
alternate strategy and only presented evidence that Wiggins did not kill the victim by 
his own hand. Id. at 2532, 2535. Trial counsel could have "introduced psychological 
reports and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins' limited intellectual capacities and 
childlike emotional state on the one hand, and the absence of aggressive patters in his 
behavior, his capacity for empathy, and his desire to function in the world on the 
other." Id. at 2532. Again however, counsel failed to proffer any evidence of Wiggins' 
life history. Id. 
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After hearing argument and receiving the court instructions on the sentencing 
task before it, the jury returned with a sentence of death. Id. 
Wiggins retained new counsel and eventually sought post-conviction relief 
through the United States Supreme Court, claiming his attorneys' performance at 
sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by 
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. 
Id. at 2532, 2534. 
To support his claim, Wiggins presented testimony by a licensed social worker 
certified as an expert by the court. Id. at 2532. The social worker's testimony 
contained "evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse [Wiggins] suffered at the 
hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster-parents." Id. at 2533. 
The social worker chronicled Wiggins' bleak life history, including being raised by a 
chronic alcoholic mother who "frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home alone for 
days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage." Id. 
Following the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Strickland, the United State Supreme Court held that in "any ineffectiveness 
case, a particular decision to not investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel's judgments." Id. at 2535 (citation omitted). The Court also reiterated that 
"[prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and 
the like...are guides to determining what is reasonable." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688-89). 
The Supreme Court observed that trial counsels' investigation drew from three 
sources: the PSI report, a psychological review, and records from the department of 
social services that tracked down Wiggins' various placements in the foster care 
system. Id. at 2536. The Court determined that this limited investigation into Wiggins' 
life history "fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 
1989. "3/d. 
The Court also stated that trial counsels' investigation was also unreasonable in 
light that they knew several facts: Wiggins' "mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins 
was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties 
while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one 
occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without food." Id. at 2537. 
The Court farther stated that trial counsel "uncovered no evidence in their 
investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been 
counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless." Id. And 
although trial counsel initially told the jury it would "hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a 
difficult life," counsel never followed up with details of Wiggins' history. Id. at 2538. 
3
 Standard practice in Maryland capital cases included the preparation of a social history 
report. Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2536. The Court also referred to the ABA Standards of 
Criminal Justice and the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989). Id. at 2537. 
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The Court held that trial counsels' investigation into Wiggins' background was 
objectively unreasonable. Id. at 2539. Although the Court emphasized that Strickland 
"does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence 
no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing," it 
stated that "[a] decision not to investigate thus 'must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances.'" Id. at 2541 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691). The Court farther held that not only was trial counsels' decision to end their 
investigation inconsistent "with the professional standards that prevailed in 1989," but 
that it was unreasonable "in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the social 
services records-evidence that would have led a reasonably competent attorney to 
investigate further." Id. at 2542. 
Although both Armstrong and Wiggins involve capital punishment cases, the 
attorneys' assistance in these respective cases was found ineffective and is applicable in 
the present case to show that Wright's trial counsel's performance fell below an 
objective reasonable standard. Moreover, sentencing in every criminal proceeding is a 
critical stage that implicates a defendant's right to due process. See State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982). See also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1980) (fundamental fairness requires that a defendant have right to inspect presentence 
report prior to sentencing). 
The 11th Circuit in Armstrong held that trial counsel's failure to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding was not trial strategy, but 
rather negligence. Armstrong, 833 F.2d at 1433. And the United States Supreme Court 
held in Wiggins that trial counsel's limited review into Wiggins' life history and failure 
to present mitigating evidence in which he was aware of or should have been aware of 
was below that of an objective reasonable standard. See Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2539-42. 
Likewise, Mendez's inadequate presentation of mitigating evidence regarding 
Wright's life history and her failure to correct the trial court's inaccurate perception of 
Wright's involvement under all the circumstances was not deliberate trial strategy. It 
was negligence and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The facts in the present case are eerily similar Wiggins and Armstrong. Wiggins 
suffered physical and sexual abuse from "a chronic alcoholic" mother who, "at least on 
one occasion...left him and his siblings alone for days without food." Wiggins, 123 
S.Ct. at 2537. The United States Supreme Court observed that because Wiggins' trial 
counsel was aware of this abuse, and its failure to investigate'further and present this 
evidence at the sentencing phase was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 2539. 
And hi Armstrong, where trial counsel failed to call several "witnesses who were 
available at the time of trial" that would have testified to "several mitigating aspects" of 
the defendant's character concerning his history of nonviolence as well as his history of 
poor living conditions, hardworking nature, and mental handicaps, the 11th Circuit 
Court of Appeals held trial counsel's performance ineffective. Armstrong, 833 F.2d at 
1433-34. 
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Despite the fact that Mendez knew about Wright's difficult childhood due to his 
alcoholic, abusive father, Mendez never made the trial court aware of the serious, 
disastrous impact this had on Wright (R. 315: 30-31). And with a little more 
investigation, Wright's trial counsel would have also discovered that Wright was also 
sexually molested as a child (R. 316: 44). Mendez also knew about Wright's positive 
history with family and friends, but never adequately informed the trial court how these 
relationships might help Wright recover from his addiction and respond favorably to 
treatment (R. 315: 30). 
And just like Armstrong, where trial counsel failed to call any mitigating 
witnesses that were available except for a parol officer, Mendez called no mitigating 
witnesses, even though she knew many would be willing to testify in Wright's behalf 
(R. 315: 19-26). Thus, Mendez's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
The United States Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has 
found that presenting such mitigating evidence of the life history of a defendant during 
the sentencing hearing is the duty of a defense attorney. See Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 
2535-6; see also Armstrong, 833 F.2d at 1434-6. 
In fact, Mendez testified at the evidentiary hearing that her representation at the 
sentencing hearing was not a result of good trial strategy (R. 315: 35). Mendez 
testified that normally, she would presume a person with a first degree felony 
conviction would face prison time, and that she would have family and friends testify at 
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the sentencing hearing or give letters to the judge to "humanize" the defendant (R. 315: 
16). Judge Burton4 agreed that Mendez should have taken additional efforts at the 
sentencing hearing, such as presuming "prison was the most likely outcome and prepare 
her presentation from that perspective" as well as offering letters of recommendation 
from "family, friends and employers" (R. 305-06). 
Instead of presenting Wright's life history, Mendez testified that she intended to 
demonstrate at the sentencing hearing that Wright was a minor player in the drug 
manufacturing operation and had a minimal criminal record (R. 315: 27). Even here, 
however, Mendez failed to provide the trial court with adequate evidence to support her 
position. Mendez testified that she did not present mitigating evidence because of her 
heavy caseload and because the PSI report recommended probation instead of 
incarceration (R. 315: 16-18). Judge Burton found that Mendez should have followed 
her typical practice in preparing for sentencing, but she failed to do so in this case (R. 
305-07). 
At the sentencing hearing, although Mendez briefly referred to statements 
already contained in the PSI report, she failed to inform the trial court how these events 
have impacted Wright's life and how such events make him a good candidate for 
reform and the need to undergo a treatment program. 
4
 Judge Burton presided over the evidentiary hearings ordered by this Court pursuant to 
Rule23B(R. 304). 
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The PSI summarily states, "In 1974, when [Wright] was three years old, his 
mother died in a car accident. Thereafter, he lived with his 'alcoholic father.'" (R. 
173: 7). Additionally, the PSI states that Wright described his childhood as "rough" 
(R. 173: 7). 
Mendez only briefly mentioned Wright's difficult childhood, stating Wright 
"doesn't come from a clean background. He had a hard time of it. His mother died. 
His father has been involved with methamphetamine and has had to really fight it." (R. 
175: 16). All the trial court knew was that Wright's mother died when he was young. 
The trial court had absolutely no knowledge of how she died and what affect this had 
on Wright. Moreover, Judge Burton found that Mendez should have presented the 
"details surrounding the death of Mr. Wright's mother" (R. 310). 
Mendez utterly failed to bring the trial court's attention to the fact that Wright 
was in the vehicle with his mother when she rolled the car several times and died as a 
result of the accident (R. 316: 42). In fact, Wright suffered serious emotional problems 
after this horrific event and blamed himself for his mother's death because he was 
standing in the vehicle distracting his mother (R. 315: 30; 316: 42). Mendez failed to 
inform the trial court that Wright was so shook up by this tragedy, that he basically did 
nothing but sit on the couch all by himself for a whole year and did not talk with 
anyone (R. 316: 42-43). 
Mendez also failed to inform the trial court about Wright's difficult life with his 
alcoholic and drug abusing father. Judge Burton also found that Mendez should have 
presented to the trial court the "details about the abuse Mr. Wright suffered at the 
hands of his father" (R. 311). Mendez only told the trial court that Wright's father "is 
a long-long-term alcoholic and the meth [sic]" (R. 175: 16). Mendez failed to explain 
to the trial court that growing up with his father was a "living hell" because his father 
was always drunk and physically and emotionally abused him (R. 316: 45-46). Wright 
actually lived in great fear during his childhood due to his father's addictions and was 
repeatedly left alone with his sister while his father was out drinking at night (R. 316: 
45). 
Mendez further failed to inform the trial court that Wright in fact had been 
sexually abused, contrary to the PSI report (R. 173: 9; 316: 51-54). Judge Burton also 
found that "the fad that Mr. Wright had been sexually abused as a child and how that 
abuse affected him" should have been disclosed to the trial court (R. 310). 
Compounded with these omissions was the fact that Wright never received any 
counseling to help him cope with these disastrous events, and Mendez never informed 
the trial court of the dangerous impact these events had on his life (R. 316: 44). 
Moreover, Mendez failed to adequately inform the trial court of Wright's 
personal character and the strong support he received from family and friends which 
would help him reform. Mendez only informed the trial court that Wright "has a work 
history. He has a good work history and he has skills. And even in all of his stupidity, 
when I talked to his family, talked to everyone, he was still an emotional father for his 
children." (R. 175: 14-15). And regarding Wright's strong family support, Mendez 
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stated only "We got three rows of people here of family that are supportive." (R. 175: 
16). Judge Burton also found that Mendez should have interviewed Wright's family 
and former employers "for the specific purpose of preparing for sentencing" (R. 306). 
Mendez simply failed to bring to the trial court's attention that Wright enjoyed great 
trust among his employers and family. His employers knew that they could trust 
Wright not to steal from them and that Wright was honest, hardworking and 
trustworthy.5 
At the sentencing hearing, Mendez only argued that Wright was eligible for a 
drug-treatment program because "I really believe that [Wright] was a minor role" in the 
operation of the clandestine laboratory (R. 175: 12), and that "he has a concern for his 
children, about financially and emotionally supporting them." (R. 175: 16). Mendez 
also stated at the sentencing hearing that Wright was taking responsibility for his actions 
and that he has cut his ties to his old drug friends (R. 175: 17). Thus, the full argument 
in behalf of Wright regarding his character and ability to reform amounted to only a 
few short sentences. 
All the trial court knew was that Wright allowed a laboratory to be operated in 
the residence where he lived with two other people and that small children were present 
in the home when the officers conducted the search (R. 175). 
5
 The exhibits entered in as evidence during the evidentiary hearing attest to this. These 
exhibits are contained hereafter in the addenda. 
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Further, the trial court was under a false presumption that Wright was involved 
not only in cooking methamphetamine, but that he was also engaged in selling the drug 
to others (R. 316: 25-26). Mendez failed to adequately inform the trial court that 
Wright was not cooking or selling the drug. Mendez only argued at the sentencing 
hearing that Wright had a "lack of knowledge as to the cooking process," but failed to 
provide any affidavits or testimony to support this (R. 175: 19). Judge Burton found 
that Mendez should at least have prepared and offered to the trial court a "sentencing 
memorandum concerning... [Wright's] role in the offense, and a comprehensive and 
detailed analysis concerning why AP&P's recommendation was appropriate" (R. 306-
07). Additionally, the trial court believed that Wright knew that children were at the 
residence where methamphetamine was manufactured (R. 175: 22; 316: 7). Mendez 
again failed to provide the trial court with contrary evidence. 
These last two failures to correct the trial court's inaccurate understanding of the 
extent of Wright's involvement with the lab prejudiced Wright substantially because the 
trial court based its sentencing primarily on the facts that Wright was heavily involved 
in cooking and selling methamphetamine, especially with children in the home (R. 316: 
7). 
Mendez's failure to provide mitigating evidence showing Wright's traumatic life 
history and her failure to correct the trial court's inaccurate understanding of Wright's 
involvement in the offense clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
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B. Had the trial court been aware of all the relevant information, Wright's 
sentencing outcome would have been different and without such pertinent 
information the trial court could not exercise sound discretion in the 
imposition of the sentence. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A reasonable probability has been 
described as that "sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Id. 
In Wiggins, after finding that trial counsels' performance was ineffective at 
sentencing, the United States Supreme Court considered the second prong under 
Strickland. The Court found that "Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in 
the first six years of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother. He 
suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent 
years in foster care. The time Wiggins spent homeless, along with his diminished 
mental capacities, further augment his mitigation case." Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2542. 
The Court further found that Wiggins' "thus has the kind of troubled history we 
have declared relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability." Id.; see also Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed. 256 (1989) ("[Evidence 
about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long 
held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background...may be less culpable than defendants who have no such 
excuse"). After reviewing Wiggins' the life history, the Court declared: 
Given both the nature and extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there 
to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, 
would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form....Moreover, given 
the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney may well have 
chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the direct responsibility challenge, 
particularly given that Wiggins' history contained little of the double edge we 
have found to justify limited investigations in other cases. 
Id. at 2542. 
Although the jury heard one significant mitigating factor-that Wiggins had no 
prior convictions, the Court in Wiggins ultimately found that "had the jury been 
confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability 
that it would have returned with a different sentence." Id. at 2543. 
In the present case, trial counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence created 
a one-sided, non-adversarial sentencing hearing. This deficient performance prevented 
the trial court from making an informed decision under the totality of the 
circumstances, thus causing a "breakdown in the adversarial process that our system 
counts on to produce just results." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
The trial court heard little evidence regarding Wright's history, other than that 
his mother died when he was three and that his father was an alcoholic (R. 173: 7; 175: 
16). As stated above, Mendez failed to present adequate mitigating evidence available 
to her at the sentencing hearing other than the evidence already distilled in the PSI 
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report (R. 173: 7, 315; 316). This deficient performance reasonably led the trial court 
to believe that Wright lived a relatively normal childhood without any mitigating factors 
to consider in his behalf. Moreover, Mendez presented little if any mitigating evidence 
that Wright enjoyed strong family ties and positive relations with former employers (R. 
175: 16). 
All the trial court knew was that a convicted felon stood before the court with 
little, if any mitigating factors in his favor. The trial court knew nothing of Wright's 
troubled life history and how this seriously affected his life. The trial court also knew 
nothing of Wright's positive family and work relationships and how these would aid in 
his recovery through a treatment program. 
Mendez's deficient performance farther led the trial court to believe that Wright 
was actively engaged in distributing methamphetamines in his neighborhood and that he 
cooked methamphetamines while children were in the home (R. 175: 21-24). As shown 
above, Mendez had evidence available that showed that Wright's only involvement was 
that he was aware that Josh Corbett was manufacturing methamphetamine in the house 
and that Wright was personally using the manufactured drug (R. 315: 27). Moreover, 
Wright always maintained that this was the full extent of his involvement (R. 173: 3, 
12). 
Wright asserts that if Mendez presented all the evidence of his life history and 
the full extent of his participation in the crime, the sentencing outcome would have 
been different. In addition, Wright asserts that the ultimate focus of this Court in 
1Q 
regards to this issue should be on fundamental fairness of the sentencing proceeding. 
See Classon, 935 P.2d at 533; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2096. 
Moreover, due process "require[s] that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. 
Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). Accord Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). "To insure fairness in 
sentencing procedure U.C.A. § 77-35-22(a)6 directs trial court's to hear evidence from 
both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed." 
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in 
part: Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.... The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence." 
However, at the evidentiary hearing, Judge Brian testified that the fact that 
Mendez failed to piesent these mitigating factors would not have changed the outcome 
of the sentence (R. 316: 9-10). Even though Judge Brian admitted that he was unaware 
of Wright's traumatic background, he testified that these events "would not affect 
[Wright's] judgment on whether or not it was illegal and unlawful to cook 
methamphetamine." (R. 316: 19). 
6
 Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-et al. has been repealed and replaced by the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 22 has now replaced § 77-35-22. 
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Judge Brian also testified that even if he were mistaken and that Wright's only 
involvement in the drug lab was knowledge that drugs were being manufactured in the 
home and that Wright was only personally consuming the drugs, this was still unlawful 
and this evidence would still not change the sentence (R. 316: 26-27). Judge Brian 
further testified that even if Wright did all he could to keep children out of the home, 
this would not make any difference "because [children] were there" (R. 316: 28). And 
although Judge Burton's Findings on Remand found that Wright was not prejudiced by 
the omitted information, Judge Burton only summarized what Judge Brian testified to at 
the evidentiary hearing and Judge Burton made no separate factual findings himself 
regarding prejudice (R. 311-12). 
Under such a standard, there would be little point in having a sentencing hearing 
if mitigating evidence regarding a defendant's conduct had no effect on the sentence 
outcome. Apparently, from the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, despite Wright's 
life history, his minimal criminal background, and his limited involvement in this 
crime, no matter what, "if you cook in this town and you come to my court you're 
going to prison" (R. 175: 24). 
Wright asserts that "[i]n discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the 
sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances involved in the crime." Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 
576, 585, 79 S.Ct. 421, 427, 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959). Likewise, a "sentencing judge 
must have 'the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics,' so that the punishment fits not only the crime, but the defendant as 
well." United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949)). 
Furthermore, "A trial court which fashions an inflexible practice in sentencing 
contradicts the judicially approved policy in favor of individualizing sentences." 
United States v. Daniels, AA6 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971) (quoting Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. at 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949)). Finally (and 
necessarily), "the exercise of a sound discretion in such a case required consideration of 
all the circumstances of the crime for 'the belief no longer prevails that every offense in 
a like legal category calls for an identical punishment (without regard to the past life 
and habits of a particular offender).'" Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. at 585, 79 S.Ct. 
at 427 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083). 
Thus, Wright was denied his Sixth Amendment right to affective assistance of 
counsel and his right to due process and fundamental fairness at sentencing because trial 
counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Accordingly, Wright asks that this Court reverse the sentence imposed in this matter 
and remand the matter to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Wright asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
sentencing order and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS SCOTT ALAN WRIGHT, 
001912104. 
COUNSEL WILL STATE AN APPEARANCE? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: DEBORAH KREECK-MENDEZ FOR 
MR. WRIGHT. MR. WRIGHT IS PRESENT HERE WITH ME FROM CUSTODY. 
MS. BEATON: BRENDA BEATON FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I HAVE, YOUR HONOR. I RECEIVED 
IT LAST NIGHT, WENT OVER IT, I CAME OVER EARLY AND WENT OVER IT 
WITH SCOTT TODAY. THERE ARE A FEW CORRECTIONS THAT I WOULD 
LIKE TO MAKE. 
THE COURT: CITE ME CHAPTER AND VERSE IF YOU WILL. 
WE WILL MAKE THE CORRECTIONS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: LET'S START ON PAGE" 5, JUVENILE 
RECORD. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: 2/18 OF '87. 
THE COURT: YES. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: IT SAYS POSSESSION OF 
MARIJUANA/USE, AND THEN IT SAYS 100 POUNDS. WELL, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT'S A BALE. AND I'VE TALKED TO SCOTT, I'VE TALKED TO HIS 
DAD. HE WAS AT SCHOOL AND HE HAD AN EIGHTH. I WILL BE GETTING 
THAT FORMALLY CHANGED, BUT I KNOW WHAT HAPPENS TO JUVENILES 
1 THAT HAVE A BALE OF MARIJUANA. AND NONE OF THAT EVER HAPPENED 
2 IN SCOTT'S FAMILY SO THAT'S JUST NOT ACCURATE. 
3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, WE'LL MAKE THE NOTE THAT YOU 
4 CHALLENGE THAT. AND THE COURT'S NOT GOING TO CONSIDER THAT AS 
5 PART OF THE SENTENCING. 
6 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: OKAY. YOUR HONOR, PAGE 7, IT'S 
7 MINOR, BUT WE WOULD WANT TO HAVE IT CORRECT. PAGE 7, 
8 BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION. PARAGRAPH 1, SECOND 
9 SENTENCE. REPORTED HIS FATHER WAS EMPLOYED BY ALLIED WHILE HIS 
10 MOTHER WORKED AT A BOWLING ALLEY. HIS MOTHER DID NOT WORK. 
11 IT'S HIS GRANDMOTHER THAT WORKED AT A BOWLING ALLEY. 
12 THE COURT: THE RECORD WILL BE CORRECTED. 
13 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: AND THEN NEXT SENTENCE, HIS 
14 MOTHER DIED WHEN HE WAS FIVE NOT WHEN HE WAS THREE. 
15 THE COURT: THE RECORD WILL BE CORRECTED. ALL RIGHT, 
16 ANYTHING FURTHER? 
17 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NOT AS FAR AS CORRECTIONS GO. I 
18 WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN ARGUMENT. 
19 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WILL HEAR FIRST 
20 FROM THE PROSECUTION, THEN FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND THEN FROM 
21 THE DEFENDANT. 
22 MS. BEATON: JUDGE, THE STATE'S POSITION IS IS THAT 
23 THE RECOMMENDATION IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE THAT ADULT 
24 PROBATION HAS PREPARED. THEY'RE RECOMMENDING APPROXIMATELY A 
25 YEAR IN JAIL AND AN IN-PATIENT COUNSELING AND ODYSSEY HOUSE. 
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AND WHILE ODYSSEY HOUSE IS A GOOD PROGRAM, AND CERTAINLY A YEAR 
IN JAIL IS A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME, THIS DEFENDANT HAS 
PLEADED GUILTY AT THIS POINT TO A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. WHAT'S 
NOT CLEAR FROM THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IS HOW SERIOUS WHAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS DOING, WHAT ACTUALLY THE DEFENDANT'S ROLE IN THIS 
CRIME WAS. I THINK, IF THE COURT HAS ANY CONSIDERATION OR ANY 
TENDENCY, THE RECOMMENDATION BY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE IS 
NOT CLEAR WHAT'S TAKING PLACE. 
WHEN THE OFFICERS GO IN TO SERVE THIS SEARCH WARRANT 
IN THE NORTHEAST BEDROOM THEY FIND A LAB SET UP AND OPERATING 
AT THAT POINT IN TIME. WHEN THE OFFICERS TALKED TO THE 
DEFENDANT THE DEFENDANT SAYS THAT IS HIS BEDROOM. AND THESE 
ARE THE TYPES OF THINGS THAT ARE FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
BEDROOM. AND IF I MAY APPROACH? 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU GIVEN A COPY OF THESE DOCUMENTS 
TO DEFENSE COUNSEL? 
MS. BEATON: DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS A COPY OF ALL THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT YOU'RE 
SEEING, THOUGH. 
MS. BEATON: THIS WAS SUBMITTED AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING THAT MS. KREEK-MENDEZ HANDLED, AS WELL AS MYSELF. THIS 
IS THE CLAN — 
THE COURT: THIS WILL BE MARKED AS PROSECUTION 1 FOR 
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. 
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MS. BEATON: AND THE OTHER ONE WAS ALSO ADMITTED, 
WHICH WAS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 3, ORIGINALLY AT PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. 
THE COURT: IT WILL BE MARKED AS PROSECUTION 2 FOR 
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. 
MS. BEATON: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: YOU MOVE THEIR ADMISSION? 
MS. BEATON: I DO. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THEY ARE BOTH RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT NOS. 1 & 2 
WERE OFFERED AND RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.) 
MS. BEATON: WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AT THIS POINT AS 
STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 IS PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CLAN LAB THAT WAS 
FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S BEDROOM. YOU CAN SEE THAT THERE'S A 
SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF SUBSTANCES. 
THE OTHER ONE IS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. IT DEPICTS 
AGAIN ALL OF THE CLAN LAB ITEMS THAT WERE SEIZED IN THIS CASE 
AND ALSO TWO OF THE CHILDREN THAT WERE FOUND INSIDE THE HOME 
WHEN THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS EXECUTED. OBVIOUSLY, THE STATE IS 
CONCERNED BECAUSE THE OFFICERS RARELY GO INTO A SITUATION WHERE 
THE CLAN LAB IS OPERATIONAL. 
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THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION TO ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE HE WANTS TO 
SAY THE ONLY THING THAT HE'S DOING IN THIS HOME IS THAT HE IS 
THE PERSON WHO WAS RENTING THE HOME, HE HAD JOSH COME INTO HIS 
HOME, THE CO-DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE, AND THAT THE CO-DEFENDANT 
WAS COOKING AND SHOWING HIM HOW TO COOK BUT HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
INVOLVEMENT IN IT. 
CLEARLY, THIS IS NOT THE SITUATION GIVEN THE 
STATEMENT THE DEFENDANT TOLD THE OFFICERS ON THAT DATE. HE 
SAID THAT THIS PARTICULAR BEDROOM WHERE THE CLAN LAB WAS FOUND 
IS HIS, HE HAD INDICATED TO THE OFFICERS WHILE HE WAS SITTING 
THERE, AND THE OFFICERS ARE PREPARING TO SEARCH VARIOUS AREAS 
OF THE HOME AND THE GARAGE, HE'S TELLING THE CHILDREN THE 
REASON THAT THE COPS ARE HERE, IT'S BECAUSE IT'S MY FAULT, I'M 
THE REASON THE COPS ARE HERE. I'M SO SORRY. BECAUSE THE 
CHILDREN ARE CRYING AT THE TIME THAT THIS IS TAKING PLACE. 
HE THEN ALSO TALKS TO THE OFFICERS WHEN THEY PUT HIM 
IN A CAR. HE INDICATES A VARIETY OF INFORMATION THAT HE HAS. 
HE'S TALKING ABOUT A JUG THAT'S FOUND AND HE SAYS THAT 
ORIGINALLY IS METH OIL. HE THEN SAYS THAT'S ACTUALLY WASTE 
PRODUCT AND HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH ALL THE WASTE 
PRODUCT. SO HE'S HOLDING ON TO THE WASTE PRODUCT. 
THERE'S ANOTHER JUG OUT IN THE GARAGE THAT'S FOUND 
AND HE SAYS THAT'S WASTE PRODUCT AS WELL AND HE DIDN'T KNOW 
WHAT TO DO WITH IT. 
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THE OFFICER HAS A CONVERSATION WITH THE DEFENDANT 
ABOUT HOW DANGEROUS THIS CRIME IS. CLEARLY, THE DEFENDANT'S 
TALKING ABOUT WASTE PRODUCT. IF HE DIDN'T THINK THAT THIS LAB 
WAS THAT DANGEROUS HE WOULD HAVE DUMPED THE WASTE PRODUCT DOWN 
THE DRAIN. INSTEAD, HE'S HOLDING ON TO IT. IT'S CLEAR TO HIM, 
HE REALLY WASN'T SURE WHAT HE OUGHT TO BE DOING WITH IT. THE 
DEFENDANT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DOING THIS. 
IN TERMS OF THE TYPE OF CRIME THAT WE HAVE HERE, ALL 
I DO 6N A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS IS PROSECUTE METH LABS, AND THAT'S 
ALL I'VE DONE EVERY DAY FOR A YEAR PERIOD OF TIME. AND THIS 
DEFENDANT'S GOT A CLAN LAB THAT THEY SEIZE 100 ITEMS FROM IT, 
ALL THREE OF THE PRECURSORS ARE FOUND IN ORDER FOR HIM TO 
MANUFACTURE, AND A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE IS 
FOUND. AND FRANKLY, TO TELL YOU THE TRUTH, THIS CASE WOULD 
HAVE BEEN SITTING IN FEDERAL COURT RIGHT NOW BUT FOR THE FACT 
THAT THE OFFICERS, WHEN THEY GOT TO THE SCENE, AND ALL OF THE 
LIQUIDS THAT THEY FOUND, AND ALL THE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES THAT 
THEY FOUND, NONE OF THOSE ITEMS WERE WEIGHED. AND IN ORDER TO 
FILE THIS IN FEDERAL COURT WE WOULD HAVE NEEDED TO KNOW THE 
EXACT AMOUNT OF WEIGHTS OF METHAMPHETAMINE THAT WE HAD ON THE 
SCENE. AND BECAUSE THAT WASN'T DONE THIS CASE GOT FILED IN THE 
STATE COURT. 
THERE'S ALSO REFERENCE IN THE POLICE, IN THE ADULT 
PROBATION AND PAROLE, THAT THERE'S A PROBLEM IN THIS PARTICULAR 
NEIGHBORHOOD AS WELL. THE DEFENDANT WAS RESIDING IN A DUPLEX. 
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AND THE INDIVIDUAL NEXT TO THE DUPLEX IS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS 
CAUGHT SELLING METHAMPHETAMINE, OF COURSE, WHICH HE'S PROBABLY 
GETTING FROM THE DEFENDANT. AND THE OFFICERS FROM SANDY CITY 
HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE THAT THAT'S WHERE 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS GETTING HIS DRUGS WAS FROM THE DEFENDANT'S 
HOME, BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO OWNS THE DUPLEX, WHO LIVES ON 
THE SIDE OF THE DUPLEX WHERE ORVILLE DORIOUS IS, HE IS THE 
OWNER OF THE DUPLEX, HE, RIGHT NOW, IS IN FEDERAL COURT ON 
CHARGES THAT I'VE INDICTED HIM ON, AND THAT'S FOR DISTRIBUTING 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
SO, CERTAINLY, THE CONCERN THE STATE HAS IS IN 
ADDITION TO THE FACT WE HAVE AN OPERATIONAL LAB, WE HAVE 
CHILDREN IN THE LAB, AND WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE ALL OF THE DANGERS 
THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS LAB, BUT WE'RE ALSO RUNNING, 
BASICALLY, A SITUATION WHERE THIS WHOLE NEIGHBORHOOD IS A 
NUISANCE BECAUSE THE DUPLEX OWNER IS RENTING TO SCOTTY WRIGHT, 
WHO HE KNOWS SCOTTY WRIGHT IS MANUFACTURING METHAMPHETAMINE, 
PROVIDING HIM PRODUCTS SO HE CAN TURN AROUND AND SELL. AND SO 
WE HAVE A NICE LITTLE (SOMEBODY COUGHED) TAKING PLACE IN THIS 
DUPLEX WHERE JOSH CORBETT ADMITS HE'S SELLING DRUGS, HE'S BEEN 
DOING THAT FOR A YEAR. HE, OF COURSE, JUST HAPPENS TO MOVE IN 
WITH SCOTTY WRIGHT. WE HAVE ALL OF THESE LAB ITEMS FOUND IN 
THIS PARTICULAR HOME. 
AND IT'S THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT AT A VERY 
MINIMUM THIS SHOULD BE A SITUATION WHERE THE DEFENDANT SHOULD 
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GO OUT TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON ON A 60-DAY EVALUATION IN ORDER 
TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THEY THINK, AFTER THEY CONSIDER ALL OF 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, WHETHER OR NOT THEY THINK HE OUGHT TO 
BE PLACED AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. BUT FRANKLY, IT'S THE 
STATE'S POSITION THAT THIS IS THE TYPE OF CRIME, IN AND OF 
ITSELF, IRREGARDLESS OF ALL OF THE OTHER HISTORY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS, HIS HISTORY IN JUVENILE COURT, HIS HISTORY IN 
THE FELONY, IN THE ADULT SYSTEM AT THIS POINT, HIS PRIOR DRUG 
USE, AND ALL OF THE CONCERNS THAT WE HAVE, THIS IS NOT A 
SITUATION WHERE THIS DEFENDANT IS JUST A USER OF DRUGS, THIS IS 
NOT A SITUATION WHERE THIS DEFENDANT CAN STAND HERE AND CLAIM 
12 | THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN HIS BEDROOM, IN HIS 
HOME, HUH-UH. AND IT'S THE STATE'S POSITION HE SHOULD BE 
PLACED AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. WE WOULD ALSO ASK FOR 
RESTITUTION FOR THE CLEAN-UP COSTS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH 
THIS LAB, WHICH ARE CONSIDERABLE, WHICH ARE IN EXCESS OF 
$4,000.00. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. COUNSEL? 
MS. BEATON: JUST ONE OTHER THING I WANTED TO MENTION 
TOO. I NOTICE THAT WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS IN THE JAIL PENDING 
21 ON THIS PARTICULAR CASE HE APPARENTLY GETS RECLASSIFIED WHILE 
22 HE IS IN THE JAIL BECAUSE EVEN WHILE HE'S PENDING THIS CASE 
23 HE'S TRYING TO MAKE ALCOHOL WHILE HE'S SITTING IN THE SALT LAKE 
24 COUNTY JAIL. AND OBVIOUSLY, HIS CONDUCT WOULD INDICATE THAT HE 
25 DOESN'T CONSIDER THIS TO BE A SERIOUS MATTER. 
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THE COURT: WELL, THE RECORD INDICATES HE'S NOT ONLY 
TRYING — 
MS. BEATON: THAT HE'S MAKING. 
THE COURT: HE MADE IT. AND THAT HE CAME TO BE THE 
OBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY ACTION. THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED IN 
MEDIUM SECURITY AFTER RECEIVING A DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR 
MAKING HOOCH. "HOMEMADE BOOZE." 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: YOUR HONOR, SCOTT'S READY TO TALK 
TO YOU ABOUT THAT CAUSE I THINK HE CAN BETTER RESPOND TO THAT. 
IT'S NOT UNCOMMON. AND THAT'S NOT AN EXCUSE, IT'S JUST VERY 
PREVALENT. 
I'D LIKE TO START WITH SOME OF MS. BEATON'S COMMENTS. 
THERE IS A PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD BUT SCOTTY WRIGHT IS 
NOT WHERE THAT PROBLEM INITIATED. ORVILLE DORIOUS IS SITTING 
IN FEDERAL PRISON. THERE WAS A LAB BUST AT THIS HOUSE MONTHS 
BEFORE, MONTHS BEFORE SCOTT WAS EVEN IN THE PICTURE. AND, IN 
FACT, WHEN I WAS TALKING TO THE OFFICERS TO SORT THIS OUT, I 
COULDN'T FIGURE THAT PART OF IT OUT. AND THE OFFICER TOLD ME 
THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH SCOTT. THEY CLEANED THAT HOUSE UP 
AND THEN MORE PEOPLE THAT ARE INVOLVED IN METHAMPHETAMINE MOVED 
IN. THAT'S WHAT THE OFFICER TOLD ME IN THE HALL WHEN I WAS 
TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THAT HAD TO DO WITH SCOTT. NOTHING. 
IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SCOTT. OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT 
SOMEBODY, MY POSITION IS, PROBABLY MR. DORIOUS, KEPT THINGS 
MOVING IN THAT HOUSE TO KEEP HIS BUSINESS GOING. 
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SCOTT IS NOT THE PERSON WHO WAS STOPPED. THE WAY 
THIS BUST WENT DOWN IS THE OFFICER DID A TRAFFIC STOP. THE 
PERSON THAT WAS STOPPED THERE SAID, WELL, I'M GOING WITH A 
FRIEND TO FIND WORK. THERE IS DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; THERE'S 
DRUGS. THERE'S A LITTLE, WHAT OFFICERS FEEL LIKE PROBABLY 
THERE IS A MEETING AT THE CONVENIENCE STORE FOR SOMETHING MORE. 
THEY GO AND THEY FOLLOW JOSH CORBETT. JOSH CORBETT, IN FACT, 
WAS GOING TO SELL DRUGS, NOT SCOTT WRIGHT. JOSH CORBETT THE 
SAYS TO THE OFFICERS, WELL, I GOT A LAB BACK AT THE HOUSE. AND 
HE SAID ALL THESE THINGS ABOUT SCOTT WRIGHT, WHICH HE, AT THIS 
TIME, IS A CO-DEFENDANT THAT IS BEING LET GO, TO WALK OFF, TO 
GO DO WHATEVER HE WANTS TO DO AT THAT TIME. THERE IS, IN FACT, 
A LAB THERE WHEN THEY SEARCH FOR THE WARRANT. THEY DID A LOT 
OF WORK ON THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR. BECAUSE I STRUGGLED WITH IT. 
AND I KNOW WHAT I BELIEVE, NOT CRITICAL, BUT I REALLY BELIEVE 
THAT SCOTT WAS A MINOR ROLE. BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN HE WASN'T 
GUILTY. AND SCOTT AND I DID A LOT OF WORK ABOUT THIS. THIS IS 
A BROAD STATUTE, YOU PROVIDE A PLACE TO COOK, YOU GET PAID OFF 
IN DRUGS, YOU'RE GUILTY. 
THE COURT: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I DO BELIEVE THAT. I DO BELIEVE 
THAT. I BELIEVE THAT THAT IS WHAT IT IS. AND I HAVE STRUGGLED 
BECAUSE I DON'T — THE STATUTE IS SO BROAD, YOUR HONOR. WE, IN 
OUR OFFICE HAVE GONE OVER IT BACKWARDS AND FORWARDS. IF YOU 
ARE A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, IF YOU, IN ANY WAY KNOW THAT THIS 
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IS HAPPENING AND CONTRIBUTE TO IT IN ANY WAY, I THINK THE 
STATUTE IS BROAD, AND AS YET IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BUT 
I'M STILL WORKING ON THAT ELEMENT OF IT. 
BUT WE HAD THIS SET FOR A MOTION. WE CAME IN. AND 
IN GETTING READY FOR THE MOTION I TALKED WITH SCOTT'S FATHER 
AND HIS FAMILY. SCOTT HAD BEEN MOVING OUT OF THAT HOUSE. HE 
WAS SCARED ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THERE BUT HE WAS ALSO 
VERY ADDICTED AND VERY MUCH STILL USING THE DRUGS. HE HADN'T 
STAYED THERE THE NIGHT BEFORE THIS HAPPENED. HIS FATHER HAD 
BEEN THERE WITH HIM MOVING ALL OF HIS STUFF OUT OF THAT ROOM. 
WHEN HE CAME BACK THE LAST TIME TO TAKE THE LAST LOAD OF STUFF, 
AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE PICTURES THERE'S NOT, IT'S NOT A 
LIVED-IN ROOM. THERE'S NOT A PLACE FOR HIM TO BE. THERE'S 
SOME, I THINK THERE IS A FISHING POLE AND A TOOL CHEST OF HIS 
LEFT IN THERE. AND THERE'S A LOCK ON THE DOOR. 
AT THE PRELIM WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME TALKING ABOUT 
THE FACT THE DOOR APPEARED TO BE KICKED IN, BUT THE OFFICER 
WASN'T SURE WHO TOOK THAT PICTURE OR WHO KICKED IT IN, BUT 
THERE IS A HOLE IN THE DOOR WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE DOOR. 
HE HAD GONE OUT TO THE GARAGE AND ASKED ORVILLE, 
WHILE HE WAS IN THE GARAGE, AND I THINK THESE PICTURES WITH THE 
KIDS THERE ARE INFLAMMATORY BECAUSE HIS GIRLFRIEND HAD COME IN 
WHILE HE WAS OUT IN THE GARAGE TALKING TO MR. DORIOUS ABOUT WHY 
HIS DOOR WAS LOCKED. MR. DORIOUS IS SAYING BECAUSE I WANT MY 
MONEY. SHE CAME IN, SHE CAME IN TO THE HOUSE WITH THE 
14 
CHILDREN. HE DIDN'T KNOW THEY WERE THERE AND SHE DIDN'T KNOW 
THAT THERE WAS A LAB THERE. HE DID TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. IT'S 
MY DRUG ACTIVITY THAT CAUSED THE POLICE TO BE HERE, THAT CAUSED 
THIS PROBLEM. AND HE WANTED THE KIDS TO BE CALM. HE WAS 
TRYING TO EASE THEM. AND HE DOES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. 
YOUR HONOR, I HAVE INTERVIEWED MANY, MANY WITNESSES. 
I HAVE PULLED UP RECORDS. JOSH CORBETT HAS THREE CLAN LABS AT 
THIS TIME, DATING ONE BEFORE AND ONE AFTER THIS INCIDENT. HE 
HAS — MR. DORIOUS HAS HIS FEDERAL CHARGES. SCOTT'S RECORD IS 
HERE BEFORE YOU. AND WHILE IT'S NOT WHAT I WOULD WANT IT TO BE 
IT IS NOT AS BAD AS WE USUALLY SEE BEFORE US. 
YOUR HONOR, SCOTT'S BEEN IN JAIL FOR A LONG TIME. IT 
IS THE FIRST TIME HIS HEAD HAS BEEN CLEARED SINCE HIS WIFE LEFT 
HIM IN '98. DRUGS PLAYED A ROLE IN THAT, BUT HE JUST WENT OFF 
THE DEEP END AT THAT POINT. HE STILL WORKED. HE'S 
CONSISTENTLY WORKED. HE PAID CHILD SUPPORT WHEN HIS WIFE WENT 
ON, GOT INVOLVED WITH THE WELFARE SYSTEM, AND I'M NOT SURE AT 
WHAT LEVEL, O.R.S. WAS GARNISHING 50 PERCENT OF HIS WAGES AND 
HE WAS PAYING THAT. NOW, IN THE RECENT MONTHS, PRIOR TO BEING 
IN CUSTODY ON THIS, HE WASN'T WORKING AS MUCH. HE WAS PICKING 
UP ODD JOBS. HE HAD FALLEN DOWN. 
BUT, YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE A YOUNG MAN HERE. HE HAS A 
WORK HISTORY. HE HAS A GOOD WORK HISTORY AND HE HAS SKILLS. 
AND EVEN IN ALL OF HIS STUPIDITY, WHEN I TALKED TO HIS FAMILY, 
TALKED TO EVERYONE, HE WAS STILL AN EMOTIONAL FATHER FOR HIS 
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CHILDREN. TOWARDS THE END HE WASN'T FINANCIALLY THERE BUT HE 
HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE. 
I KNOW THIS CASE IS BAD, BUT HIS ROLE IN IT IS 
DIFFERENT THAN JOSH CORBETT'S. JOSH CORBETT IS A PERSON THAT 
IS AT A GAS STATION, FOR WHAT I WOULD PURPORT THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE, AND YOU GOT TO GIVE IT THE WEIGHT THE COURT REQUIRES, 
BUT IT LOOKS LIKE HE'S THERE TO GIVE THIS OTHER GUY A DRUG 
DEAL. AND HE'S OUT. HE'S OUT ON, HE WAS OUT, HE GOT OFF OF 
THE FIRST LAB --
MS. BEATON: HE'S ON WARRANT. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: HE'S NOT ON WARRANT NOW, HE'S IN 
JAIL NOW. 
THE COURT: JUST A MOMENT. YOU'RE ENTITLED TO SAY 
WHATEVER YOU WANT WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. GO AHEAD. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: OKAY. YOUR HONOR, HE HAD A LAB 
AND GOT OUT. THERE'S TWO WAYS YOU GET OUT WHEN YOU HAVE A LAB, 
YOU'RE A STELLAR CITIZEN, BUT FOR THAT, YOU BAIL --SO THERE'S 
FOUR WAYS — YOU TELL, YOU GIVE INFORMATION, YOU PROVIDE THE 
POLICE WITH SOMEONE ELSE, WHICH I WOULD BET IS WHAT JOSH 
CORBETT'S ENTIRE PLAN WAS IN THIS. 
HE DID HAVE A WARRANT FOR A LONG TIME AND THEN HE WAS 
RECENTLY PICKED UP AND SENT SCOTT A LETTER, WHICH SCOTT 
PROMPTLY SAID TO ME, LOOK, THIS WILL DO IT. AND IT SAYS, MAN, 
I'M SORRY YOU'RE IN THIS MESS, I'M SORRY I GOT YOU IN THIS 
MESS, I'LL DO ANYTHING FOR YOU. WHICH I SAID, WELL, THAT AND A 
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DOLLAR WILL GET YOU A CUP OF COFFEE, CAUSE THAT'S NOT WORTH 
ANYTHING TO THE COURT. BUT IT DOES TELL ME THAT JOSH DOES HAVE 
A ROLE IN ALL OF THIS, HE HAS A BIGGER ROLE THAN SCOTT. 
WE GOT THREE ROWS OF PEOPLE HERE OF FAMILY THAT ARE 
SUPPORTIVE. SCOTT DOESN'T COME FROM A CLEAN BACKGROUND. HE 
HAD A HARD TIME OF IT. HIS MOTHER DIED. HIS FATHER HAS BEEN 
INVOLVED WITH METHAMPHETAMINE AND HAS HAD TO REALLY FIGHT IT. 
HE'S REALLY IMPROVED AND HE WORKED REALLY HARD TO BE ABLE TO 
PROVIDE ME AND WORK WITH ME IN THIS CASE. SCOTT CAN SEE THAT 
SOMEONE CAN DO THAT, THEY CAN PULL OUT OF IT. IT'S NOT BEEN 
EASY. HIS DAD IS A LONG, LONG-TERM ALCOHOLIC AND THE METH, 
YOUR HONOR, I DON'T BELIEVE A DIAGNOSTIC IS 
NECESSARY. WE HAVE A REALLY SERIOUS DRUG ADDICT. HE'S GOING 
TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE ALCOHOL. IT IS A PROBLEM. I KNOW 
THAT. BUT I WOULD ASK YOU, YOUR HONOR, TO GIVE HIM THE YEAR IN 
JAIL BUT LET HIM BE RELEASED WHEN THERE'S A BED AVAILABLE. AND 
YOUR HONOR, I WOULD ASK YOU TO LEAVE IT TO THE P.O. THAT'S 
ASSIGNED. WE HAVE HIM SCREENED FOR FIRST STEP. AND 
REALISTICALLY, HE'S FINE TO GO TO ODYSSEY. AND WE HAVE HIM SET 
UP FOR THAT. 
HE HAS A CONCERN ABOUT HIS CHILDREN, ABOUT 
FINANCIALLY AND EMOTIONALLY SUPPORTING THEM. I WOULD PREFER HE 
BE AT FIRST STEP HOUSE. HIS SISTER THINKS HE NEEDS A YEAR OF 
TREATMENT. FIRST STEP CAN PROVIDE THAT FOR HIM BECAUSE HE WILL 
DO THE IN-PATIENT PART OF IT. THAT'LL BE FOUR TO SIX MONTHS, 
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DEPENDING ON HIS SUCCESS, THEN HE'LL DO THE AFTER CARE. THEY 
SLOWLY WORK HIM BACK INTO THE COMMUNITY, WHICH IS CRITICAL WITH 
METHAMPHETAMINE, WHICH WORKS ON COMMUNITY TRIGGERS. 
THIS IS A YOUNG MAN WHO HAS WORKED REALLY HARD WITH 
ME ON THIS CASE. HE HASN'T BEEN, IT HASN'T BEEN AN ATTITUDE OF 
I DON'T CARE, OR I'M NOT PART OF THIS, OR I'M NOT RESPONSIBLE, 
IT'S, I JUST WANT THE JUDGE TO KNOW WHAT I'M REALLY RESPONSIBLE 
FOR. AND I ARGUE THAT THIS, IN FACT, IS WHAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR. THERE WAS A LAB THERE BUT HE DIDN'T PUT THAT THERE AND HE 
DIDN'T SET IT UP THERE, BUT HE SURE TOOK IN THE PROCEEDS AND 
ALLOWED IT TO HAPPEN AND ALLOWED IT TO CONTINUE ON. AND HE PUT 
HIMSELF AROUND PEOPLE. AND HE'S CUT THOSE TIES. IT'S HIS 
FAMILY WHO IS HERE TODAY, IT'S NOT THOSE FRIENDS. IT'S HIS 
FAMILY, WHO, HE' S BURNED THEM MORE TIMES THAN HE WANTS TO 
REMEMBER. HIS COMMENTS TO ME IS THEY ARE THE PEOPLE THAT 
THROUGH IT ALL, THROUGH MY ATTITUDE, THROUGH MY EVERYTHING, 
HAVE BEEN SITTING THERE, WERE THERE FOR ME. THEY ARE AREN'T 
AFRAID TO CONFRONT HIM. IT'S AMAZING TO ME HOW QUICKLY THEY'LL 
CALL HIM ON HIS LITTLE B.S. THAT HE HAS. 
I WOULD ASK YOU TO PLEASE GIVE HIM THE TIME IN JAIL 
BUT LET HIM GET OUT WHEN THERE'S A BED, WHICH COULD BE A WHILE, 
ESPECIALLY IF YOU DETERMINE THAT ODYSSEY IS APPROPRIATE. HE 
WILL DO THE DIAGNOSTIC BUT I THINK WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SIMILAR 
RESULTS. HE HAS WORKED HARD BUT FOR THE MAKING ALCOHOL IN THE 
JAIL. HE IS NOT A BEHAVIOR PROBLEM, HE'S NOT A DISCIPLINE 
18 
PROBLEM, AND PROBABLY WILL, AFTER HIS PUNISHMENT PERIOD'S OVER, 
BE RECLASSIFIED BACK TO MINIMUM IN MY EXPERIENCE. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING THE DEFENDANT WOULD LIKE TO SAY? 
THE DEFENDANT: YEAH, YOUR HONOR. AS FAR AS THE 
HOOCH INCIDENT'S CONCERNED. 
THE COURT: THAT'S A NO BRAINER WITH THE COURT. 
LET'S MOVE ON. 
THE DEFENDANT: ALL RIGHT. I'D JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT 
I KNOW HOW IT ALL APPEARS. 
THE COURT: HOW DOES IT APPEAR? 
THE DEFENDANT: WELL, IT APPEARS THAT — 
THE COURT: TELL ME, INASMUCH AS YOU HAVE OPENED UP 
THE DIALOGUE WITH THE COURT, WHOSE BEDROOM WAS ALL THE STUFF 
THAT'S SET FORTH IN THE EXHIBIT 1 OWNED BY? 
THE DEFENDANT: IT WAS THE BEDROOM THAT I OCCUPIED. 
THE COURT: NO. 2, HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN A RESIDENT 
OF THAT HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: TWO MONTHS. 
THE COURT: NO. 3, HOW MANY BEDROOMS IN THE HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THREE. 
THE COURT: HOW MANY OCCUPANTS IN THE HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THREE. 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD AND SAY WHAT YOU'D LIKE. 
THE DEFENDANT: WELL, I'D JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT AS 
FAR AS THE POLICE, THAT SAID THAT I TOLD 'EM WHERE THINGS WERE 
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OR WHAT NOT, I WAS INTERROGATED FOR SIX HOURS IN THE GARAGE AND 
I DID LET 'EM KNOW WHAT I KNEW ABOUT WHERE THINGS WERE. AS FAR 
AS JOSH HAD TOLD ME. AND THERE WAS A LOCK ON MY DOOR. I 
HADN'T BEEN IN THAT ROOM AND SEEN ANY LAB SET UP. I DIDN'T 
KNOW IT WAS IN THERE OR I WOULDN'T HAVE CLAIMED IT AS MY ROOM. 
I WASN'T ON THE LEASE AND IT'S REALLY, IT'S REALLY NOT MY GIG, 
YOUR HONOR. I KNOW IT LOOKS THAT WAY AND THE PROSECUTION'S 
MAKING IT OUT TO BE THAT WAY, BUT I JUST HOPE YOU CAN SEE ME 
FOR WHO I AM AND KNOW THAT I DESERVE A SECOND CHANCE. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: YOUR HONOR, I WILL NOTE ONE 
POINT. HE DID HAVE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO THE COOKING 
PROCESSES AS I TRIED TO WORK, TO TALK TO HIM, AND I KNOW IT 
DOESN'T TAKE AN EINSTEIN TO MAKE METHAMPHETAMINE, BUT IN MY 
CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM IT DEFINITELY WAS SOMEONE ON THE 
PERIPHERY HAD GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, HE EVEN CALLED THE STUFF IN 
THE JUGS WHEN HE TOLD THE OFFICER THERE'S SOME STUFF THAT I 
THINK THAT'S DANGEROUS, HE CALLED IT METH OIL, AND IN FACT IT 
WASN'T METH OIL IT'S METH WASTE. 
THE COURT: NEVERTHELESS, DANGEROUS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: DANGEROUS, BUT IT KINDA SUPPORTS 
THAT HE DID HAVE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, WHICH I KNOW THAT'S A 
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD BECAUSE MESSING WITH THIS STUFF WITH A LACK 
OF KNOWLEDGE IS DANGEROUS BUT IT'S NOT SOMETHING HE'S GOING TO 
PROLIFERATE. AND HE IS NOT ONE OT THESE PEOPLE THAT GETS HIGH 
OFF OF THE HIGH OF COOKING. HE IS SOMEONE, IF YOU GIVE HIM A 
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SHOT AT THIS HE'S GOING TO DO IT. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ANYBODY ELSE WOULD LIKE TO SAY? 
MS. BEATON: ALSO, HE IDENTIFIED THE VENT BAG IN THE 
GARAGE AND TOLD THE OFFICERS THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL OF THAT AS 
WELL. THE SITUATION, TO CLARIFY WITH JOSH CORBETT, HE WAS OUT 
ON BENCH WARRANT AND THE COPS WERE LOOKING FOR HIM. HE WAS 
ORIGINALLY ARRESTED AND RELEASED ON SOME SORT OF RELEASE 
ARRANGEMENT AND THEN OUT ON BENCH WARRANT SO HE HASN'T BEEN 
RUNNING THE STREETS, HE HASN'T PROVIDED ANY COOPERATION, AND 
HE'S CURRENTLY SET FOR TRIAL ON THIS SAME CHARGE RIGHT NOW. 
ORVILLE DORIOUS IS NOT IN FEDERAL PRISON AT THIS 
POINT. HE'S CURRENTLY PENDING ON HIS CHARGES. AND HIS M.O. IS 
HE LIKES TO RENT TO COOKS. DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE 
CHARGES THAT HE HAS THAT WAS DURING THE TENURE WHEN SCOTT 
WRIGHT WAS IN THE DUPLEX NEXT TO HIM, NOT THE OTHER CLAN LAB 
COOK THAT HE HAD RENTED TO PREVIOUSLY. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MS. BEATON: THAT'S IT. 
THE COURT: ANY LEGAL REASON WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT 
BE IMPOSED? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: EVERYONE HAS TAKEN A GENEROUS AMOUNT OF 
TIME IN EXPLAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON THE CASE. LET 
THE COURT, UNLESS THERE'S TOO MUCH READING BETWEEN THE LINES 
GOING ON BY THE COURT, EXPLAIN ITS POSITION. 
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IN THE FIRST PLACE, IF YOU STARTED WITH THE MOST 
FUNDAMENTAL OF ALL FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS HOUSE 
HAD THREE BEDROOMS, IT WAS THE DEFENDANT'S HOUSE, AS FAR AS THE 
BEDROOM IN IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED IT, THERE'S NO DISPUTE ABOUT 
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE BEDROOM, AND IT'S NOT UNCOMMON FOR THREE 
OR FOUR OR FIVE ADULTS TO RENT A HOUSE AND EACH ONE OF THEM 
STAKE OUT THEIR OWN LITTLE BAILIWICK INSIDE THE HOUSE AND USE 
COMMON AREAS BETWEEN THEM. BUT THE BEDROOM GENERALLY IS AN OFF 
LIMITS PLACE. GENERALLY. 
IT DEFIES LOGIC AND IT DEFIES REASON FROM THE COURT'S 
POINT OF VIEW THAT THE DEFENDANT NOT ONLY WAS EXTREMELY MINDFUL 
AND AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE HOUSE, IN HIS BEDROOM, 
BUT HE ACQUIESCED AND PARTICIPATED. IF SOMEBODY RENTED A HOUSE 
AND PAID THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE RENT AND A CO-TENANT BROUGHT 
ALL THAT STUFF IN AND STUCK IT IN HIS BEDROOM AND HE DIDN'T 
WANT IT THERE, THE FIRST THING HE'D DO IS PUNCH THE CO-TENANT, 
CALL THE POLICE, ROUND THE STUFF UP AND THROW IT IN A DUMPSTER. 
AND THAT JUST SIMPLY ISN'T WHAT HAPPENED HERE. 
BEYOND THAT, METH IS A DIRTY, UGLY, DESPICABLE, 
DEPLORABLE BUSINESS. IT'S NOT MADE FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSUMPTION, 
IT'S MADE FOR DISTRIBUTION. IT IS POISON THAT CAN BE COOKED BY 
ANYBODY THAT HAS A MODEST AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE THAT CAN READ. 
THE RECIPES ARE PUBLISHED ON THE INTERNET. AND IT'S NOT LIKE 
GROWING EIGHT OR 10 MARIJUANA PLANTS AND HARVESTING THOSE 
PLANTS PERIODICALLY FOR YOUR OWN USE. WHEN PEOPLE START 
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COOKING THIS STUFF THEY KNOW TWO THINGS. IT'S A POISON THAT IS 
IN HIGH DEMAND AND IT IS A POISON THAT HAS A HIGH MARGIN OF 
PROFIT. IT COSTS LITTLE OR NOTHING TO MAKE IT AND THE PROFIT 
IS ABSOLUTELY MIND-BOGGLING. AND IT JUST MAKES THE WHOLE 
NOTION OF COOKING THAT MUCH MORE DESPICABLE. ANYBODY WITH A 
HUNDRED BUCKS, 50.00 BUCKS, OR WHATEVER THE GOING PRICE IS ON A 
GIVEN MORNING CAN KNOCK ON THE DOOR AND KNOW THERE'S A FRESH 
BATCH THAT'S BEEN COOKED AND THEY LAY THE QUID PRO QUO ON THE 
PALM OF THE HAND, THIS STUFF IS IN THE OTHER HAND, AND THEY'RE 
OUT OF THE DOOR AND ON THEIR WAY. 
THE PROBLEM IS WITH WHAT IS SO ABSOLUTELY GLARING IN 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 THAT WAS ADMITTED FOR PURPOSES OF 
THIS SENTENCING, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE 
CHEF, THIS STUFF IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS. AND YOU CAN PICK UP A 
NEWSPAPER AND PRACTICALLY ON A DAILY BASIS SOME PLACE, ONE OF 
THESE THINGS GOES SOUTH AND A FIRE STARTS OR A CONTAMINATION 
GETS SPREAD. AND WHAT DO THESE KIDS KNOW ABOUT IT? THEY'RE 
THERE EXPOSED TO ALL OF THE STUFF THAT GOES ON. THEY DON'T 
HAVE THE SOPHISTICATION THAT EITHER A DETECTIVE OR DEFENDANT 
CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES FROM IT. THE STUFF, FIRST AND FOREMOST, 
IS UGLY TO THE PEOPLE WHO USE IT AND THEN IT CONTAMINATES THE 
PEOPLE IN THE HOUSE, IT CONTAMINATES THE PEOPLE IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD, IT CONTAMINATES THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY. AND 
IF I'M THE ONLY ONE IN THIS ENTIRE COURTROOM THAT HAS MADE THAT 
DEDUCTION SO BE IT. THAT IS MY OPINION. 
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AND I DON'T BUY INTO THIS NOTION THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE THREE MONKEYS THAT WE READ ABOUT 
PERIODICALLY, THEY SEE NOTHING, THEY HEAR NOTHING, THEY SPEAK 
NOTHING. I'M NOT BUYING IT. 
AND WE KNOW FOR SURE THAT FOR WHATEVER REASON HE WAS 
GETTING ENOUGH OF THIS STUFF FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL USE. I MEAN, 
THERE HAD TO BE SOME QUID PRO QUO SOME PLACE ALONG THE WAY. 
IT'S A VERY COLD, IT'S A VERY CALLOUS, IT'S A VERY CALCULATING, 
UGLY SUBCULTURE AND PEOPLE UP AND DOWN THIS STREET AND UP AND 
DOWN THE STREETS OF EVERY TOWN IN THE UNITED STATES SEEM TO BE 
EITHER DIRECTLY OR TANGENTIALLY VICTIMIZED WITH THIS. THE TAX 
PAYERS IN THIS CASE HAVE A $4,000.00 BILL BECAUSE POLICE 
OFFICERS HAVE TO DRESS UP LIKE ASTRONAUTS AND GO INTO THAT 
APARTMENT AND CLEAN IT UP. THIS STUFF IS SO HIGHLY 
CONTAMINATED THAT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO SMELL IT, THEY'RE NOT 
GOING TO TOUCH IT, THEY'RE NOT GOING TO STEP IN IT. THEY DRESS 
UP LIKE THEY'RE GOING TO MARS TO DEAL WITH IT. WHAT KIND OF 
PROTECTION DO THE KIDS HAVE? THEY RUN AROUND BAREFOOTED WITH 
A SHIRT AND A PAIR OF PANTS ON. IT IS JUST ABSOLUTELY 
DESPICABLE. 
I'VE READ THE PRESENTENCE REPORT CAREFULLY. I AM 
CONVINCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THIS MESS UP TO HIS EARS. 
AND I HAVE READ NOR HEARD NOTHING TODAY THAT CAUSES ME TO THINK 
TO THE CONTRARY. 
HE'S BEEN CONVICTED OF A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. NO 
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LEGAL REASON HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE 
IMPOSED. HE'S COMMITTED TO THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY FOR THE 
TERM PRESCRIBED BY LAW. HE IS FINED $10,000.00 AND THE MAXIMUM 
SURCHARGE IS IMPOSED. HE IS ORDERED TO PAY THE CLEANUP FEE 
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, IF SOMEBODY ELSE IS INVOLVED IN THAT 
PROCESS. AND IT IS MY HOPE THAT THIS MORNING, THE WORD GOES 
OUT, IF YOU COOK IN THIS TOWN AND YOU COME TO MY COURT YOU'RE 
GOING TO PRISON. 
TAKE HIM AWAY. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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^terk of the Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Scott Allen Wright, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 20010345-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne. 
This case is before the court on a motion to remand the case 
to the trial court for entry of findings of fact necessary for 
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The rule allows supplementation of the record with "findings of 
fact necessary for the appellate count's determination of a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). 
Wright alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in 
advising him on the elements of the offense to which he entered a 
guilty plea. Because Wright did not file a timely motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999), 
we do not remand on this issue, which constitutes a challenge to 
the validity of the guilty plea. Wright also alleges that trial 
counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing. Our 
remand is limited to issues regarding the latter claim. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion for remand is granted, 
in part, and the case is temporarily remanded to the trial court 
for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to only the 
claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at 
sentencing. The factual issues relevant to the claim to be 
addressed by the trial court shall include the following: (1) 
what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in preparation for 
sentencing and what additional efforts could have been 
undertaken; (2) what were counsel1s reasons for handling 
sentencing as counsel did; (3) what additional information 
relevant to sentencing could have been discovered by counsel 
prior to sentencing; and (4) was the omission of the additional 
information prejudicial to Wright at sentencing. 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
448 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
DEAR BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE MEMBERS, 
I AM SENDING THIS LETTER ON BEHALF OF MY BROTHER SCOTT WRIGHT 
#31529. SCOTT IS CURRENTLY BETNG HOUSED AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
AFTER PLEADING GUILTY TO A FIRST DEGREE FELONY DRUG CHARGE. 
FIRST, LET ME1 THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY OPINIONS 
AND FEELINGS REGARDING SCOTT, THIS IS SOMETHING I HAVE NOT YET HAD 
THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING. I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHERE TO BEGIN, I GUESS 
WHAT 1 WOULD LIKE DO IS TO TRY AND GIVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE PERSON THAT 
I KNOW AND LOVE. THERE ARE SO MANY THINGS THAT I THINK YOU SHOULD 
KNOW BEFORE DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF TIME YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE 
FOR HTM. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I REALIZE A CRIME HAS BEEN 
COMMITTED AND THAT THERE ARE PUNISHMENTS THAT MUST BE ENFORCED IN 
ORDER TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC, MY FAMILY INCLUDED. I AM 33,1 HAVE FOUR 
CHILDREN 12,11,10, AND 8. I HAVE BEEN MARRIED TO THE SAME PERSON FOR 
OVER THIRTEEN YEARS. I AM A LAW ABIDING CITIZEN WHO ON OCCASION HAS 
HAD A SPEEDING TICKET. MY HUSBAND HAS BEEN EMPLOYED WITH THE SAME 
COMPANY FOR OVER TEN YEARS. WE OWN A HOME, WE PAY TAXES AND LIVE 
LIKE A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN SALT LAKE DO. I WANT YOU TO KNOW I AM 
NOT A DRUG USER, NOR DO I CONDONE SUCH BEHAVIOR, AND I AM AS 
CONCERNED FOR MY CHILDREN AND THEIR SAFETY AS ANYONE IS. I DON'T 
KNOW THAT I CAN EXPRESS TO YOU HOW MUCH MY FAMILY MISSES SCOTT. 
SCOTT IS A VERY SENSITIVE AND LOVING PERSON WHO HAS ALWAYS DONE FOR 
OTHERS BEFORE HIMSELF. MY BROTHER IS HOWEVER A DRUG ADDICT AND HAS 
MADE SEVERAL WRONG DECISIONS DURING HIS BOUT WITH ADDICTION. ONE 
THING I WOULD LIKE TO IMPRESS UPON YOU IS THE FACT THAT EVEN THOUGH 
SCOTT HAS THIS VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM, HE STILL REMAINS A LOYAL, 
TRUSTWORTHY, DEPENDABLE PERSON. SOMETHING THAT IS VERY RARE UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. MOST ADDICTS ARE NO LONGER DEPENDABLE, THEY 
ARE NOT IN ANY WAY CARING, THEY ARE SIMPLY CONSUMED WITH ONLY 
THEMSELVES. THIS IS NOT THE CASE FOR MY BROTHER. THROUGH ALL OF HIS 
LIFE HE HAS BEEN VERY MUCH THE OPPOSITE. IF HE WAS NEEDED, HE WAS 
THERE. YOU COULD ASK HJM FOR ANYTHING AT ANYTIME AND NEVER BE 
REFUSED. SINCE THIS HAS HAPPENED I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK 
WITH A FEW OF HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS, ALL OF WHOM SAID THE SAME OF 
HTM AND INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO EMPLOY HTM AGAIN IF HE 
SO DESIRED WHEN I HEAR SUCH COMMENTS FROM OTHERS IT MAKES ME VERY 
PROUD. SCOTT HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STEAL FROM THESE EMPLOYERS 
AS MANY OF THEIR EMPLOYEES DID. HE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF HIS FAMILY, TO LIE, TO CHEAT AS WELL AS COUNTLESS OTHER 
THINGS THAT MOST ADDICTS FIND THEMSELVES DOING IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A 
HABIT THEY CAN NO LONGER CONTROL. SCOTT DID NONE OF THESE THINGS. 
THROUGHOUT HIS ADDICTION THE WORSE THING HE DID TO ANY OF US AND 
HIMSELF WAS TO DENY WHAT IS NOW SO PAINFULLY OBVIOUS. SCOTT WILL BE 
30 THIS JUNE, AND UNFORTUNATELY IF YOU WERE TO ASK HIM WHAT HE HAS 
OR WHAT HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED HE WOULD TELL YOU VERY LITTLE. BUT 
EVEN WITH THIS BEING THE CASE, WHEN TIMES WERE BAD AND HE HAD NO 
MONEY, HE DID NOT COME AND ASK TO BORROW MONEY HE KNEW HE COULD 
NOT REPAY, HE DID NOT TAKE IT FROM US, INSTEAD HE WOULD COME AND 
MOW YOUR LAWN, OR CLEAN YOUR GARAGE, OR WHATEVER ELSE YOU NEEDED. 
EVEN WHEN YOU WOULD TELL HIM "SCOTTY, ITS OK YOU DON'T NEED TO DO 
THAT", HE WOULD INSIST. HE NEVER WANTED YOU TO FEEL AS THOUGH YOU 
WERE BEMG TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF ANYTHING YOU DID DO FOR HIM, FEED 
HIM, GIVE HIM A RIDE, BORROW HIM YOUR PHONE, NEVER WENT 
UNAPPRECIATED, HE ALWAYS SAID THANK YOU, GAVE A KISS AND TOLD YOU 
HE LOVED YOU BEFORE LEAVING. SCOTT HAS HAD SEVERAL THINGS TO 
OVERCOME IN HIS LIFE. WHEN HE WAS THREE HE WAS INVOLVED IN A CAR 
WRECK WITH HIS MOTHER. SHE SUBSEQUENTLY DIED AT THE SCENE AFTER 
BLEEDING TO DEATH RIGHT IN FRONT OF HTM. SCOTT WAS THEN LEFT IN THE 
CARE OF HIS FATHER WHO BECAME TERRIBLY DEPRESSED AND BECAME A 
BIKER, AN ALCOHOLIC, AND A DRUG ADDICT. THOUGH THIS WAS THE CASE 
SCOTT WOULD NOT LEAVE HIS FATHER HE ALWAYS FELT HE NEEDED TO HELP 
TAKE CARE OF HTM, EVEN WHEN HE WAS LITTLE. I WISH AT THIS TIME HE 
WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SELF CENTERED, MAYBE THEN HE WOULD HAVE 
DETERMINED TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF FIRST AND NOT WORRY ABOUT OTHERS 
WHOM HE COULD NOT HELP (EVEN THOUGH HE WANTED TO OR THOUGHT HE 
COULD) AND JUST MAYBE HIS LIFE WOULD BE ELSEWHERE TODAY. AS IF THIS 
WEREN'T ENOUGH. HE WAS OCCASIONALLY LEFT IN THE CARE OF A FAMILY 
MEMBER WHO SEXUALLY ABUSED HTM. SCOTT CONTINUED TO LIVE WITH HIS 
FATHER UNTIL HE BECAME AN ADULT AND WAS MARRIED. I AM CERTAIN THAT 
THE REASONS MY BROTHER HAS COME TO BE SO DEPENDANT ON DRUGS IS TO 
DEAL WITH THE MANY SITUATIONS HE WAS UNABLE TO OVERCOME AS A CHILD, 
THIS WAS WHAT HE SAW DAY IN AND DAY OUT AS A METHOD OF DEALING WITH 
PAIN, THEREFORE I BELIEVE THE ADDICTION CAME EASY TO HIM. SCOTTY DID 
WELL FOR A SHORT TIME WHILE MARRIED BUT AFTER PROBLEMS WITH HIS 
MARRIAGE, THEY DIVORCED AND HE RETURNED TO THE DRUG USE. THROUGH 
ALL OF THIS HE HAS ALWAYS REMAINED SWEET, LOYAL AND LOVING. I LOOK 
AT HTM AND THINK HE HAS EVERY EXCUSE TO BE A HORRIBLE PERSON, BUT 
SCOTT IS NOT. I AM DISAPPOINTED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO GET THE TREATMENT 
THAT HE NEEDS HOWEVER, I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO 
SOON. SCOTT HAS THREE CHILDREN WHO MISS HIM MORE THAN I DO. HE HAS 
BEEN A VERY LOVING FATHER SCOTTS MIDDLE CHILD, A SON THAT IS 7, IS 
HAVING AN ESPECIALLY HARD TIME DEALING WITH THE SEPARATION FROM HIS 
DAD. I AM SADDENED TO SEE THE EFFECT THIS IS HAVING ON THESE KIDS. I 
CANNOT HELP BUT FEEL AS THOUGH THIS SENTENCE IS NOT ONLY SCOTTS TO 
SERVE BUT ALSO MANY, MANY OTHERS AND I OFTEN WONDER HOW 
APPROPRIATE IT REALLY IS. 1 HAD COMMENTED TO THE ATTORNEY (AFTER HIS 
SENTENCING) THAT THIS SENTENCE WAS SO INAPPROPRIATE FOR SOMEONE 
WHO CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS HIS WRONGDOING AND WHO HAS DETERMINED 
TO GET ON THE RIGHT TRACK AND REMATN THERE, I FOUND TT HARD TO 
BELIEVE THAT OUR REQUESTS TO HAVE HTM PLACED ON HOUSE ARREST AND/OR 
FOR HIM TO BE PLACED INTO A LOCK DOWN TREATMENT CENTER WERE 
REFUSED. I WONDERED {WITH THE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM) IF THE 
SYSTEM IS SET UP TO HELP THE INDIVIDUAL ANYMORE OR JUST SIMPLY TO 
PUNISH THEM. I BELIEVE THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS SERVING TIME WITH MY 
BROTHER WHO ARE NOT GOING TO EVER CHANGE BUT THIS IS NOT ALWAYS THE 
CASE. MANY PEOPLE MAKE HUGE MISTAKES BUT MANY OF THESE PEOPLE 
LEARN FROM THOSE MISTAKES AND GO ON TO BECOME BETTER THAN THEY 
WERE BEFORE, AND 1 TRULY BELIEVE THAT SCOTT IS ONE OF THESE PEOPLE. AN 
EASY EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF PERSON MY BROTHER IS BRINGS ME TO ONE 
TIME IN HIS LIFE THAT HAS ALWAYS STOOD OUT TO ME THE VERY MOST., WHEN 
HE WAS 13-14 YEARS OLD HE HAD GOTTEN A TEN-SPEED BICYCLE FOR 
CHRISTMAS OR HIS BIRTHDAY OR SOMETHING ANYWAY, I WENT TO VISIT SCOTT 
AND MY FATHER ONE AFTERNOON AND I DTD NOT SEE THE BIKE. FEARING IT 
HAD BEEN STOLEN (AND KNOWING THIS WAS ABOUT THE ONLY THING HE HAD 
BESIDES A COUPLE PAIR OF JEANS A SHIRT OR TWO, OH AND A PAIR OF TENNIS 
SHOES), I ASKED HTM WHERE HIS BIKE WAS, HE SAID TO ME, VERY MATTER- OF-
FACT "I GAVE IT AWAY", WHAT! I SATD..."I GAVE IT AWAY" HE REPEATED. 
WHEN I ASKED WHO HE HAD GIVEN THE BIKE TO, HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD 
BEEN DOWNTOWN (MTDVALE) AND HE SAW A HOMELESS MAN PUSHING A 
BROKEN DOWN, BEAT UP BIKE WITH A FLAT TIRE DOWN THE STREET, AND HE 
LOOKED AT HTM AND SAID "HERE YOU NEED THIS MORE THAN I DO, I'LL TRADE 
YA" OF COURSE THE HOMELESS MAN TOOK HTM UP ON THE OFFER AND I DON'T 
THINK MY BROTHER HAS THOUGHT TWICE OR FELT BAD ABOUT THAT FOR EVEN 
ONE MINUTE SINCE. THIS IS INDICATIVE OF HIS BEHAVIOR AND ALWAYS HAS 
BEEN, HE HAS DONE THINGS SIMILAR TO THIS THAT HAVE AMAZED US ALL, THIS 
IS THE PERSON THAT I KNOW AND LOVE, THE PERSON WHO HAS MADE WRONG 
DECISIONS BUT A PERSON WHO HAS SO MUCH POTENTIAL AND WHO HAS 
ALWAYS DONE MORE GOOD THAN BAD. I ASK YOU TO PLEASE CONSIDER ALL OF 
THIS WHEN YOU SET OUT TO DETERMINE HIS PAROLE DATE AND I URGE YOU TO 
GIVE HIM A SECOND CHANCE, IKNIOW HE WILL MAKE THE MOST OF IT. 
VERY SINCERELY, 
LISANETLSON 
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To whom it may concern: 
Scott Wright has been a friend and an employee of ours 
for approximatly IS years. He was an asset to our 
company and a loyal friend at all times. Scotty would 
come to our home shortly after I had a baby c-section 
and offer his help with anything. He would help with the 
yard and my other children without ever being asked. 
Scott Wright has had his share oflifes hard knocks, but 
we honestly believe that with the right guidence he could 
and would be a great asset to the world, as well as our 
company. He has a job waiting for him and will always 
have us as friends. 
Over the years, in the construction business, we have 
seen many people fall due to one thing or the other, but 
never have we had to worry about Scott stealing from us 
or anything like that, unlike other employees and friends 
in the past 
In closing we pray that you will be lienent on Scott as his 
life has not been what a child deserves to have, and 
unfortunatly with that type of raising some people tend to 
stray, however we truly believe that Scott Wright has a 
chance given the right choices to make. 
Any questions will be welcome please call Mark or Kelly 
Morey, Morey's Custom Siding, Inc at (801) 568-3955. 
Thank you for your time! 
Sincerely, 
Mark and Kelly Morey 0 
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TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS MEMBERS 
MY NAME IS SHERI WRIGHT AND THIS LETTER IS IN REGARDS TO SCOTT A. 
WRIGHT, MY NEPHEW BY MARRIAGE. I HAVE KNOWN SCOTTY FOR 15 YEARS. 
I FEEL HE IS A TROUBLED YOUNG MAN AND NEEDS INTENSIVE DRUG 
REHABILITATION. SCOTTY IS A VERY INTELLIGENT AND COMPASSIONATE MAN 
WITH A LOT TO OFFER HIS FAMILY AND HIS COMMUNITY. SCOTTY HAS THREE 
CHILDREN WHO NEED A CLEAN AND SOBER FATHER AND I BELIEVE WITH SOME 
REHABILITATION SCOTT COULD BE A VERY GOOD DAD, HE LOVES HIS CHILDREN 
VERY MUCH. SCOTTY HAS A VERY STRONG AND SUPPORTIVE FAMILY, I KNOW 
THAT IF SCOTT CHOOSES TO BE CLEAN AND SOBER HE COULD BE A VERY 
PRODUCTIVE MEMBER OF SOCIETY. I UNDERSTAND THAT WHAT SCOTTY DID 
WAS VERY DANGEROUS AND WRONG, J. JUST DON'T BELIEVE THAT PRISON IS THE 
ANSWER FOR HM. SO MANY LIVES ARE RUINED BY DRUGS AND ALCOHOL AND I 
BELIEVE THAT GIVEN THE CHANCE SCOTT COULD CHANGE. I HAVE BEEN A 
MEMBER OF A 12 STEP PROGRAM FOR OVER 10 YEARS, I ATTEND 12 STEP 
MEETINGS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND WOULD BE VERY SUPPORTIVE OF SCOTT. 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO READ THIS LETTER AND I HOPE THAT YOU 
WILL GIVE SCOTT THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE AND BETTER HIS LIFE. 
SINCERELY, 
SHERI WRIGHT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLEN WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS ON REMAND 
Case No. 001912104 
Hon. MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
December 3, 2002 
On or about May 15f 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
the above-entitled matter back to the trial court for the purpose 
of entry of findings of fact on the following factual issues: 
(la) what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in 
preparation for sentencing; (lb) what additional efforts could 
have been undertaken; (2) what were counsel's reasons for 
handling sentencing as counsel did; (3) what additional 
information relevant to sentencing could have been discovered by 
counsel prior to sentencing; and (4) was the omission of the 
additional information prejudicial to Wright at sentencing. 
The Court held evidentiary hearings relevant to the Court of 
Appeals Order of Remand on July 12, 2002 and August 23, 2002. 
Closing arguments were heard on October 16, 2002, at which time 
the parties also presented the Court with their proposed findings 
of fact. Having considered the evidence offered by the parties 
STATE v. WRIGHT Page 2 FINDINGS ON REMAND 
and having listened to and reviewed the argument of counsel, the 
Court makes the following findings of fact: 
la. What efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in 
preparation for sentencing? 
The Court finds the following: 
a. Counsel received the presentence report the night 
before the sentencing hearing and reviewed it. 
b. Counsel met with Mr. Wright for approximately 15 
minutes and read through the presentence report 
with him. 
c. Counsel talked briefly with Mr. Wright's sister. 
d. Counsel made notes on her copy of the presentence 
report for her argument. 
lb. The Court finds that counsel could have undertaken the 
following additional efforts in preparation for 
sentencing: 
a. Presume prison was the most likely outcome and 
prepare her presentation from that perspective; 
b. Review the presentence report in more careful 
detail as was counsel's typical practice; 
c. Compare the facts contained in the PSR with the 
facts counsel had documented in her file during 
the course of the defense, which was counsel's 
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typical practice; 
d. Contact the defendant's previous employers, which 
was counsel's typical practice; 
e. Interview the defendant's family for the specific 
purpose of preparing for sentencing, which was 
counsel's typical practice; 
f. Meet with and interview the defendant's children 
and the mother of his children, which was 
counsel's typical practice; 
g. Visit with the defendant in person and review the 
presentence report in careful detail, which is 
counsel's typical practice; 
h. Collect and offer to the Court, counsel and AP&P, 
letters of recommendation from the defendant's 
family, friends and employers, which was counsel's 
typical practice; 
i. Prepare an outline for argument in order to assure 
there was a cohesive framework in which to present 
the argument at sentencing; 
j. Prepare and offer to the Court a sentencing 
memorandum concerning the defendant's history, the 
facts of the case, the defendant's role in the 
offense, and a comprehensive and detailed analysis 
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concerning why AP&P's recommendation was 
appropriate. 
k. Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that she did not believe 
she properly represented defendant at the 
sentencing hearing. "[T]his case haunts me/' she 
said. "I could have done more. I wish there were 
a different result." 
1. Ms. Kreek-Mendez further stated that she believed 
she should have offered testimony from defendant's 
family, friends and employers who would have 
characterized defendant as honest, hardworking and 
trustworthy. According to Ms. Kreek-Mendez, such 
information is important because it "humanize[s]" 
the defendant. 
2. What were counsel's reasons for handling sentencing as 
she did? 
The Court finds that counsel handled sentencing as she 
did for the following reasons: 
a. AP&P offered a favorable recommendation; 
b. The defendant had a minimal criminal history; 
c. The defendant had good family support; 
d. Defendant had been out of custody and done very 
well; 
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e. At the time, counsel was working on two high 
profile sex abuse cases. When counsel compared 
her sex abuse cases to the defendant's case, the 
defendant's case seemed relatively benign by 
comparison. As such, in counsel's mind, prison 
seemed unlikely. 
f. Based on all of the forgoing factors, counsel 
presumed prison was unlikely. As such, counsel 
did not prepare for the sentencing hearing as 
earnestly as she normally would, given the 
severity of the offense. 
g. Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that her goal at the 
sentencing hearing was to demonstrate that 
defendant was a minor player in the drug 
manufacturing operation with a minimal criminal 
history. She opined that she did a "good job" and 
was "pretty effective." According to Ms. Kreek-
Mendez, the case was pretty clear cut and she 
believes she properly conveyed to the sentencing 
judge that defendant had good qualities, including 
that he was a good father. 
h. Ms. Kreek-Mendez acknowledged that her task was 
not easy. "A lab is the worst thing you can work 
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with. It is the most potential for 
incarceration." Moreover, because defendant's 
crime was a first degree felony, Ms. Kreek Mendez 
believed that "the chances should be the 
presumption of prison on the part of the defense 
attorney." 
i. Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that she was involved in 
other demanding cases which she judged to have a 
greater potential for prison time. For that 
reason, she believes she did not devote the time 
needed to properly prepare for defendant's 
sentencing. She also testified that she relied 
too heavily on the presentence report and added 
that the report "was written by, in my opinion, 
the most difficult report writer, someone who 
always recommends substantial incarceration; 
frequently recommends prison. He didn't." 
j. Ms. Kreek-Mendez indicated that offering testimony 
from defendant's family at the hearing was 
considered, but that such a tactic was 
problematic. For example, Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated 
that having defendant's father testify would be 
difficult because, "I knew they would have to go 
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the bar where his dad was. I knew that one of my 
concerns about his dad was . . . that he was going 
to be sober on the day he testifies. . . . I 
remember lengthy conversations about what kind of 
witness dad would be in trying to help his son. 
He couldn't even be there." 
3. What additional information relevant to sentencing 
could have been discovered by counsel prior to 
sentencing? 
The Court finds that counsel could have discovered the 
following information: 
a. Those letters of recommendation and the 
information contained as represented by exhibits 
1-7; (Specifically, defendant offered seven 
letters from friends and family members which were 
submitted to the Board of Pardons. Ms Kreek-
Mendez stated that the letters were representative 
of the kind of letters she ordinarily solicits for 
sentencing, but failed to do so in this case.) 
b. The details surrounding the death of Mr. Wright's 
mother; 
c. The fact that Mr. Wright had been sexually abused 
as a child and how that abuse affected him; and 
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d. The details about the abuse Mr. Wright suffered at 
the hands of his father. 
4. Was the omission of the additional information 
prejudicial to Mr. Wright at sentencing? 
The Court finds the following: 
a. Judge Pat Brian was the sentencing judge. Judge 
Brian testified that Ms. Kreek-Mendez had 
represented defendants in his court on many 
occasions and that he believed she was an 
excellent attorney. He said that her performance 
at defendant's sentencing hearing was no 
exception. He said he did not find Ms. Kreek-
Mendez' s performance in any way deficient-least of 
all her alleged failure to present testimony from 
defendant's friends and family. 
b. Judge Brian testified that he did not believe 
defendant was a minor player in the clandestine 
lab. He noted that manufacturing paraphernalia 
was found in what defendant admitted was his 
bedroom. Judge Brain also noted that defendant 
was familiar with the location of chemicals and 
waste materials in other parts of the home. 
Finally, the large quantity of methamphetamine and 
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precursor chemicals confiscated from defendant's 
home-and the fact that there were children present 
at the home during the police raid-also weighed 
heavily in favor of a harsh penalty. 
c. These facts, said Judge Brian,, led to the 
conclusion that defendant was "up to his armpits" 
in manufacturing methamphetamine. 
d. Judge Brian stated that because defendant was 
intimately involved the operation, additional 
evidence concerning his character, work ethic and 
family support would not have made any difference 
in the sentence imposed. Judge Brian further 
stated that testimony concerning the death of 
defendant's mother or his alcoholic and abusive 
father would have made no difference because they 
were events that happened nearly 30 years ago and 
could not excuse the serious criminal activity in 
which defendant was involved. Similarly, the 
testimonials of family and friends that defendant 
was a good father, hard-working, reliable, 
trustworthy and caring would have been equally 
unavailing in view of the seriousness of the crime 
of manufacturing methamphetamine. 
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e. Based upon the forgoing, Judge Brian concluded 
that none of the evidence defendant claims should 
have been introduced at his sentencing hearing 
would have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
According to Judge Brian, "He may have been well-
deserving of more than . . . five to life on 
that." 
DATED this 3> day of December, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
